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EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
W. Wendell Hall *
I. INTRODUCTION
URING the first year of the Clinton administration, The Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 was enacted by Congress and signed
into law. With a Democrat President and Democrat-controlled
Congress, employers expect to see a significant amount of legislation intro-
duced proposing broader rights and remedies for employees for employment
discrimination. Further legislative developments with respect to employee
benefits, civil rights and traditional labor-management issues are almost cer-
tain to follow.
Notwithstanding these developments within our federal system, I the focus
of Texas employers remains upon the Texas state courts. In an interesting
development during this past year, the Texas Supreme Court expressly
adopted the tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. 2 While
the supreme court limited its application in termination of employment
cases, 3 the court failed to articulate clear standards as to what constitutes
"extreme and outrageous conduct" in the employment context, thereby leav-
ing plaintiffs room to avoid summary judgment.4 Employers, therefore, can
take little comfort in the court's decision. In addition to challenges to the
employment-at-will doctrine, creative plaintiffs' attorneys continue to load
their petitions with a variety of tort claims as a means of challenging a wide
array of conduct occurring at the workplace.
In recent months plaintiffs have successfully sued their former employers
for a variety of tort claims including invasion of privacy and defamation. In
one case, Hagler v. Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co.,5 a jury awarded
former employee Don Hagler more than $15,500,000 for publishing defama-
tory statements about him. In another case, Caldwell v. Texas Instruments,6
former employee Glenn Caldwell sued TI for defamation and the jury
* Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., San Antonio. B.A., The University of Texas;
J.D., St. Mary's University.
The author wishes to express his sincere appreciation to Diana Sanchez-Servais, legal secre-
tary at Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., for her dedication and hard work in typing and proof-
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1. This survey is limited to developments in employment and labor law under the Texas
Constitution, statutes, and common law.
2. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 612 (Tex. 1993).
3. Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1993).
4. Id. at 737 (Hecht, J., concurring, joined by Enoch, J.).
5. No. 91-5250-E (101st Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex. Apr. 23, 1993), on appeal, No.
06-94-00012-CV (Tex. App.-Texarkana).
6. No. 91-9486 (192d Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex. Nov. 18, 1993).
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awarded him more than $1,385,000 in damages. It is estimated now that as
many as one-third of all defamation cases in the nation arise in the employ-
ment context. 7 Angry and disgruntled employees are raising claims for defa-
mation and invasion of privacy arising out of their termination of
employment, along with the more traditional claims such as employment
discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. These two
recent cases, and the cases discussed in this Survey, illustrate the potential
exposure for employers for significant tort damages arising out of the dis-
charge of employees. The Texas courts continue to wrestle with wrongful
discharge claims which are pleaded more in the nature of tort claims than
breach of employment or contract claims. While plaintiffs continue to plead
new theories of recovery against their former employers or otherwise at-
tempt to circumvent the employment-at-will doctrine, recent decisions in
Texas and in other states have demonstrated serious reservations concerning
any other exceptions to the at-will doctrine.8 Nevertheless, developments in
employment law in Texas and throughout the other states demand careful
attention and study by employers and their counsel.
7. Robert E. Sheeder, Defamation and Invasion ofPrivacy: Big Verdicts Hit Texas, I THE
TEXAS LABOR LAW LETTER I at 6 (Jan. 1994).
8. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (Ariz. 1985) (fun-
damental change in employment-at-will doctrine should not be result of judicial decision);
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 397 n.31 (Cal. 1988) ("Legislatures, in making
such policy decisions, have the ability to gather empirical evidence, solicit the advice of ex-
perts, and hold hearings at which all interested parties may present evidence and express their
views .... "); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982) ("Courts
should proceed cautiously if called upon to declare public policy .... "); Adler v. American
Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) ("declaration of public policy is
normally the function of the legislative branch"); Melnick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
749 P.2d 1105, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 822 (1988); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp.,
448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y. 1983) (holding:
If the rule of nonliability for termination for of at-will employment is to be
tempered, it should be accomplished through a consequence of judicial resolu-
tion of the partisan arguments of individual adversarial litigants .... The Legis-
lature has infinitely greater resources and procedural means to discern the
public will, to examine the variety of pertinent considerations, to elicit the views
of the various segments of the community that would be directly affected and in
any event critically interested, and to investigate and anticipate the impact of
imposition of such liability.);
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis. 1983) (stating "Courts should
proceed cautiously when making public policy determinations."); Whittaker v. Care-More,
Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 396-97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (holding
[A]ny substantial change in the employee-at-will rule should first be microscopi-
cally analyzed regarding its effect on the commerce of this state. There must
first be protection from substantial impairment of the very legitimate interests of
an employer in hiring and retaining the most qualified personnel available or the
very foundation of the free enterprise system could be jeopardized. . . . Tennes-
see has made enormous strides in recent years in its attraction of new industry of
high quality designed to increase the average per capita income of its citizens
and thus, better the quality of their lives. The impact on the continuation of such
influx of new businesses should be carefully considered before any substantial
modification is made in the employee-at-will rule.)
Id. (emphasis added).
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II. EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
The employment-at-will doctrine provides that employment for an indefi-
nite term may be terminated at will and without cause, absent an agreement
to the contrary. 9 Although the Texas legislature has enacted statutory ex-
ceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine,' 0 the doctrine has remained in-
tact, with only one narrow public policy exception, for the last 106 years.'1
9. E.g., Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993) (per
curiam); Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); Winters v.
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 723 (Tex. 1990) (citing East Line & R.R.
Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888)); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc.,
865 S.W.2d 247, 252 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Doe v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d 248, 254 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ granted); Amador v.
Tan, 855 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied).
10. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 125.001 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge for exercising
rights under Agricultural Hazard Communication Act); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 122.001 (Vernon 1986) (discharge for jury service); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 161.007
(Vernon 1986) (discharge for attending political convention); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§§ 431.005-431.006 (Vernon 1990) (discharge for military service); id. § 554.002 (Vernon
Supp. 1994) (discharge of public employee for reporting violation of law to appropriate en-
forcement authority); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (dis-
charge for refusing to participate in an abortion); id. art. 5182b, § 15 (Vernon 1987) (discharge
for exercising rights under Hazard Communication Act); id. art. 5547-300, § 9 (Vernon Supp.
1990) (discharge due to mental retardation); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 101.052 (Vernon Supp.
1994) (discharge for membership or nonmembership in a union); id. § 52.041 (Vernon Supp.
1994) (discharge for refusing to make purchase from employer's store); id. § 52.051 (Vernon
Supp. 1994) (discharge for complying with a subpoena); id. § 21.051 (Vernon Supp. 1994)
(discharge based on race, color, handicap, religion, national origin, age, or sex); id. § 21.055
(Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge for opposing, reporting or testifying about violations of the
Commission on Human Rights Act); id. § 451.001 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge based on
good faith workers' compensation claim); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.43(m) (Vernon Supp.
1994) (discharge due to withholding order for child support); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 242.133 (Vernon 1992) (discharge of nursing home employee for reporting abuse or
neglect of a resident).
There are also numerous federal statutory exceptions to an employer's right to discharge an
employee at-will. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168
(West 1973 & Supp. 1990) (discharge for union activity, protected concerted activity or filing
charges or giving testimony); Title VII of-the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2000e-16 (West 1981 & Supp. 1990) (discharge on the basis of race, sex, pregnancy, national
origin and religion); Civil Rights Act of 1991, 29 U.S.C. § 626; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1981a,
1988, 2000e, 2000e-l, 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-16, 12111, 12112 and 12209 (West Supp. 1992)
(discharged based on discrimination); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (West 1988 & Supp. 1 1989) (discharge based on discrimination); Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (West 1985 & Supp. 1990) (discharge on basis of
disability in programs receiving federal funds); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 1870, and 1871, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985-1992, 1994-1996 (West 1988) (discharge for discriminatory rea-
sons); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (West 1988) (dis-
charge of employees for exercising rights under the Act); Employment Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140-1141 (West 1988) (discharge of employees to prevent
them from attaining vested pension rights); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 215-216 (West 1988 & Supp. 1 1989) (discharge for exercising rights guaranteed by the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Act); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
42 U.S.C. §§ 101-108) (West 1991) (discharge on basis of disability).
11. Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); McClendon v,
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 807 S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1991); Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 726; Sabine Pilot
Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985); East Line & R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex.
70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888); Amador v. Tan, 855 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1993, writ denied) (refusing to create additional public policy exceptions to the at-will rule);
Jones v. Legal Copy, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 922, 925 Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ)
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In 1985, the Texas Supreme Court created the only non-statutory exception
to the at-will doctrine in Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck.12  The Sabine
("The employment-at-will doctrine is the law of our state."); Federal Express Corp. v.
Dutschmann, 838 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 846
S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam); Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., No. 01-92-
00134-CV, 1993 WL 414700, $4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 14, 1993, motion for
rehearing pending) ("Texas continues to remain committed to the judicially-created employ-
ment at-will doctrine."); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 252 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ requested) (Texas adheres to the employment at will
doctrine); Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1992, writ denied); McAlister v. Medina Elec. Co-op., Inc., 830 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1992, writ denied); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coward, 829 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied. See also Moulton v. City of Beaumont, 981 F.2d 227, 230
(5th Cir. 1993); Pease v. Pakhoed Corp., 980 F.2d 995, 1000 (5th Cir. 1993) (employment at
will doctrine well settled in Texas); Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 426 (5th
Cir. 1991) (at-will doctrine alive and well in Texas); Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374 (5th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1267 (1992) (recognizing only one exception to at-will
doctrine in Texas); Zimmerman v. H. E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 591 (1991) (Texas courts continue to follow historical at-will rule); Spiller v.
Ella Smithers Geriatric Ctr., 919 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 1990) (Texas Supreme Court "has
decided that a public policy halo surrounds the at-will doctrine"); Manning v. Upjohn Co., 862
F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1989) (Texas courts not hesitant to declare employment-at-will doc-
trine alive and well); Geise v. The Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., No. H-91-2703, slip op. at 4
(S.D. Tex Apr. 5, 1993); (Texas has long followed the employment at will rule); Rayburn v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of the U.S., 805 F. Supp. 1401, 1403 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (Texas
courts have long recognized the employment at will doctrine); Knerr v. Neiman Marcus, Inc.,
No. H-90-3641, slip op. at 7 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 1992) (Texas follows the employment at will
doctrine); Morton v. Southern Union Co., No. 3-89-0939-H, slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Tex. June 17,
1991) (recognizing long-standing at-will rule in Texas); Perez v. Vinnell Corp., 763 F. Supp.
199, 200 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (recognizing long-standing at-will doctrine in Texas); Taylor v.
Houston Lighting and Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 301 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (Texas courts have
continuously recognized employment at-will rule); Scott v. Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 89-1839, slip
op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 1990) (at-will doctrine remains firmly entrenched in Texas com-
mon law).
12. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985). In 1989, the Texas Supreme Court in McClendon v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), affid on remand,
807 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991), created a short-lived second exception and held that public policy
favoring the integrity in pension plans requires an exception to the employment-at-will doc-
trine when an employee proves that the principal reason for his discharge was the employer's
desire to avoid contributing to or paying for benefits under the employee's pension fund. Id. at
71. The United States Supreme Court, however, held that ERISA preempted the McClendon
common law cause of action. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990). In
1990, the Texas Supreme Court declined an opportunity to expand the public policy exception
in Sabine Pilot or to adopt a private whistle blower exception to the at-will doctrine. Winters
v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 723 (Tex. 1990). The Texas Whistle
Blower Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1991) protects
state employees from adverse employment decisions for reporting in good faith violation of law
to an appropriate law enforcement authority). For a complete discussion of Winters, see Philip
J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45
Sw. L.J. 331, 334-36 (1991). Assuming that the Texas Supreme Court eventually recognizes a
second exception to the at-will doctrine to protect private employees from adverse employment
decisions for reporting in good faith a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement
authority, see Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 725, such a cause of action will probably generate a
significant amount of litigation. See Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Green, 855 S.W.2d 136
(Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied) (jury awarded $13,500,000 to a state employee dis-
charged for reporting wrongdoings within his agency); Janacek v. Triton Energy Corp., No.
90-07220-M (Dist. Ct. of Dallas County, Texas, May 22, 199 1) (jury awarded $124,000,000 to
a former employee who was discharged for refusing to sign an annual report allegedly contain-
ing misleading information). See also City of Houston v. Leach, 819 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (employee recovered damages after being dis-
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Pilot court held that public policy, as expressed in the laws of Texas and the
United States which carry criminal penalties, required an exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine when an employee has been discharged for re-
fusing to perform a criminally illegal act ordered by his employer.' 3 Since
that decision, many discharged employees have unsuccessfully tried to bring
their claim of wrongful discharge within that exception.' 4
charged from employment for reporting violations of law to the appropriate authorities) and
Lastor v. City of Hearne, 810 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, writ denied) (city
employee discharged for reporting violation of law recovered damages under Texas Whistle
Blower Act).
13. Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735; see Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1171 n. 16
(5th Cir. 1988) ("Sabine Pilot can be reasonably read as restricted to instances where the viola-
tions of law the employee refused to commit 'carry criminal penalties' ") (quoting Sabine Pilot,
687 S.W.2d at 735). But see Johnston v. Del Mar Distributing Co., 776 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied). In Del Mar, the court held that
the Sabine Pilot exception necessarily covers a situation where an employee has
a good faith belief that her employer has requested her to perform an act which
may subject her to criminal penalties. Public policy demands that she be al-
lowed to investigate into whether such actions are legal so that she can deter-
mine what course of action to take (i.e., whether or not to perform the act).
Id. at 771.
14. E.g., Pease v. Pakhoed Corp., 980 F.2d at 1000 (amended complaint that fails to allege
that plaintiff was ordered to violate laws that carried criminal penalties does not state claim
under Sabine Pilot); Guthrie, 941 F.2d at 379 (allegation that plaintiff was instructed to violate
unspecified customs regulations does not state claim under Sabine Pilot); Aitkens v. Arabian
American Oil Co., No. 90-2884, slip op. at 3 (5th Cir. June 14, 1991) (not published) (dentist's
contention that he was fired for refusing to violate ethical or professional standards or to en-
gage in tortious activities insufficient under Sabine Pilot); Willy, 855 F.2d at 1171 n. 16 (Sabine
Pilot exception is limited to cases where the violations of law which the employee refused to
commit carry criminal penalties); Hoinski v. General Elec. Corp., No. 3:91-CV-1034 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 4, 1992) (plaintiff could meet Sabine Pilot test because one reason for his termination
was his admitted role in an improper pricing scheme); Gallagher v. Mansfield Scientific, Inc.,
No. H-90-2999, slip op. at 4-5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 1991) (plaintiffs refusal to sell inter-aortic
balloons he believed to be defective and unreasonably dangerous and presenting risk of death
or serious bodily injury not within Sabine Pilot exception); Haynes v. Henry S. Miller Manage-
ment Corp., No. CA3-88-2556-T, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1990) (discharge in retalia-
tion for reporting illegal fraudulent expense reports of former high-ranking management
employees not within Sabine Pilot exception); McCain v. Target Stores, No. H-89-0140, slip
op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 1990) (discharge in retaliation for investigating falsification of time
cards by another employee not within Sabine Pilot exception); Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 724-25
(Texas Supreme Court declined to extend Sabine Pilot to cover employees who reported illegal
activities); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. App.-Houston
[ist Dist.] 1993, writ requested) (employer's requirement that employee take a polygraph test
not within Sabine Pilot exception); Medina v. Lanabi, Inc., 855 S.W.2d 161, 163-65 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ requested) (employees failed to bring claim within Sab-
ine Pilot exception); Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1991), rev'd on other grounds, 856 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1993) (discharged employee who claimed
discharge was due to her possession of information which could implicate the company in
criminal misconduct did not state claim under Sabine Pilot); Paul v. P.B.-K.B.B., Inc., 801
S.W.2d 229, 230 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (claim of discharge due
to objections to exploratory shaft for a nuclear waste storage project for Department of Energy
not within Sabine Pilot); Hancock v. Express One Int'l, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 634, 636-37 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (court declined to extend Sabine Pilot to include employees
discharged for performing illegal acts which carry civil penalties); Burt v. City of Burkburnett,
800 S.W.2d 625, 626-27 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied) (claim of discharged po-
lice officer that discharge was the result of his refusal not to arrest a prominent citizen for
public intoxication and thus refusing to perform an illegal act not within Sabine Pilot).
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A. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
When the term of employment is left to the discretion of either party or is
left indefinite, either party may terminate the contract at will and without
cause.15 During the past several years, however, wrongful discharge litiga-
tion based on the violation of a written or oral employment agreement has
increased. Written or oral employment agreements may indeed modify the
at-will rule and require the employer to have good cause for the discharge of
an employee.16
1. Written Modifications of the Employment-at- Will Doctrine
To avoid the employment-at-will doctrine and establish a cause of action
for wrongful termination based on a written contract, an employee must
prove that he and his employer had a contract that specifically prohibited
the employer from terminating the employee's service at-will.17 The written
contract must provide in a "special and meaningful way'' 8 that the em-
ployer does not have the right to terminate the employment relationship at
will. 19 The necessity of a written contract arises from the statute of frauds
15. E.g., Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993) (per
curiam); Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); East Line, 72
Tex. at 75, 10 S.W. at 102; Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 836 S.W.2d 664, 667
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ granted); see also Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall,
Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 97, 98-99 nn.8 & 9
(1988) (citing several cases discussing employment-at-will doctrine).
16. East Line, 72 Tex. at 75, 10 S.W. at 102; Goodyear Tire, 836 S.W.2d at 667-68; cf
Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735 (court held that an at-will employee may not be terminated for
refusing to commit illegal act; noting statutory limitations on employment-at-will doctrine).
See generally Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-941 (1988) (employees of the state are generally at-
will employees).
17. Moulton v. City of Beaumont, 991 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1993); Zimmerman v. H. E.
Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 591 (1991) (applying
Texas law); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1993, writ requested); Lee-Wright, 840 S.W.2d at 577; Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v.
Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied); Wilhite v. H. E. Butt
Co., 812 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ); Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle,
Inc., 754 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); Stiver v. Texas Instru-
ments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); Benoit v.
Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Webber v. M. W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986,
writ refd n.r.e.).
18. Lee Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992,
no writ) (quoting Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1987, writ refd n.r.e.)). See infra note 20-21 and accompanying text.
19. Morton v. Southern Union Co., No. 3-89-0939-H, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Tex. June 17,
1991); Knerr v. Neiman Marcus, Inc., No. H-90-3641 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 1992); Lee-Wright,
840 S.W.2d at 577; Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275, 277 (W.D. Tex.
1989); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1993, writ requested); McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. 1989),
rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), afld on remand, 807 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991) (quoting Benoit, 728
S.W.2d at 406); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d at 846; Webber v. M. W. Kel-
logg Co., 720 S.W.2d at 127. In Webber v. M. W. Kellogg Co., the court held that to establish
a cause of action for wrongful discharge, the discharged employee must prove that there was a
written employment agreement that specifically provided that the employer did not have the
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requirement that an agreement which is not to be performed within one year
from the date of the making must be in writing to be enforceable. 20
Where no actual employment contract exists, arguments have been made
that an employer's letter to an employee regarding his position or salary
(stated per week, month or year) may provide a basis upon which the em-
ployee may argue that there is a written employment contract. The cases,
however, are somewhat difficult to reconcile and appear to be decided on the
specific facts of each case. 21 A similar, but usually unsuccessful argument
for avoiding the employment-at-will doctrine is the argument that an em-
ployee handbook or employment application constitutes a contractual modi-
fication of the at-will relationship. 22 Texas courts have generally rejected
right to terminate the contract at will. 720 S.W.2d at 126. In Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 406, the
court added that the writing must "in a meaningful and special way" limit the employer's right
to terminate the employment at will. But cf Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (court suggested that the phrase "in a special
and meaningful way" is not a necessary part of analysis).
20. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Vernon 1987); Rodriguez, 716 F. Supp.
at 277; Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D. Tex. 1989); Winograd, 789
S.W.2d at 310-11 (citing Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982); Morgan v. Jack
Brown Cleaners, Inc. 764 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied)); Stiver, 750
S.W.2d at 846; Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 406.
21. Lee-Wright, 840 S.W.2d at 577 (citing general rule). See Winograd, 789 S.W.2d at
310) (letter confirming employment and annual salary held to be a contract of employment);
Dobson v. Metro Label Corp., 786 S.W.2d 63, 65-66 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (mem-
orandum reflecting annual salary held insufficient to constitute a contract); W. Pat Crow Forg-
ings, Inc. v. Casarez, 749 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied) (letter
agreement promoting employee to supervisor and assuring employee that he could return to
previous position if he was not a satisfactory supervisor protected employee from at will termi-
nation); Dech v. Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, 748 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Tex. App.-
Houston [lIst Dist.] 1988, no writ) (employer's subsequent confirmation letter regarding em-
ployment and employee's annual salary held not to be a written contract); see also Molnar v.
Engels, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 224, 225 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (demand
for annual salary indicates plaintiff assumed his employment agreement was for one-year
term); Watts v. St. Mary's Hall, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ
refd n.r.e.) (letter stating the salary and length of employment equated to a contract for term
of employment); Culkin v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 354 S.W.2d 397, 400-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1962, writ ref d) (letter presented jury question as to terms of employment); Dallas
Hotel Co. v. Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(letter contemplating at least one year of employment together with plaintiff's detrimental reli-
ance on contents of letter presented jury question); Dallas Hotel Co. v. McCue, 25 S.W.2d 902,
905-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1930, no writ) (without specified period of service, the deter-
mination is fact sensitive). In Sornson v. Ingram Petroleum Servs., Inc., No. H-86-3923 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 2, 1987), the plaintiff was offered employment in a letter stating that he would be
paid "at a rate of $58,000 per year." After nine months of employment, the plaintiff was
discharged and he sued for breach of contract. The court stated that the sole issue was
whether, under Texas law, an offer of employment promising compensation and an annual rate
creates, upon acceptance, an employment contract for a one-year term, or whether such lan-
guage merely establishes a rate of pay under a contract of unlimited duration. The court held
that despite promising an annual. salary, the contract was of unlimited duration and therefore
terminable at will.
22. Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., No. 89-2216, slip op. at 8-9 (5th Cir. Sept. 12,
1989) (not published); Bowser, 714 F. Supp. at 842; Glagola v. North Texas Municipal Water
Dist., 705 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (E.D. Tex. 1989); Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683
F. Supp. 596, 622 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. 152, 156
(E.D. Tex. 1987); Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge,,831 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1992, writ denied); Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); Stiver, 750 S.W.2d at 846; see also Brian K. Lowry, The
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such arguments, adhering to the general rule that employee handbooks do
not constitute written employment agreements provided the handbooks (1)
give the employer the right to unilaterally amend or withdraw the hand-
book, (2) contain an express disclaimer that the handbook constitutes an
employment contract, or (3) do not include an express agreement mandating
specific procedures for discharging employees.23 Therefore, employee claims
of a contractual modification of the at-will relationship based on a handbook
have generally been unsuccessful. 24
Employment contracts may also modify the at-will rule. Texas follows
the general rule which provides that hiring at a stated sum per week, month
or year is definite employment for the period named and may not be ended
at-will. 25 Once the employee meets his burden of establishing that the con-
tract of employment is for a term, the employer has the burden to establish
good cause for the discharge. 26 To establish a claim for wrongful discharge,
the employee has the burden to prove that he and his employer had a con-
Vestiges of the Texas Employment-At-Will Doctrine in the Wake of Progressive Law: The Em-
ployment Handbook Exception, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 327 (1986) (applying principles of consid-
eration and mutuality to employment handbooks).
23. Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1991); Zimmerman v.
H. E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d at 471-72; Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 462-63
(5th Cir. 1991); Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., No. 89-2216, slip op. at 8-9; Manning v.
Upjohn Co., 862 F.2d 545, 547 n.2 (5th Cir. 1989); Joachim v. AT & T Information Sys., 793
F.2d 113, 114 (5th Cir. 1986); Blinker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. SA-88-CA-1256, 1991
WL 329563, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 1991); Morton v. Southern Union Co., No. 3-89-0939-
H, slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Tex. June 17, 1991); Perez v. Vinnell Corp., 763 F. Supp. 199, 200-01
(S.D. Tex. 1991); Bowser, 714 F. Supp. at 842; McAlister v. Medina Elec. Co-op, Inc. 830
S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied); Valdez v. Church's Fried
Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. at 622; Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. at 156; Federal
Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam); Johnson v.
Randall's Food Markets, Inc., No. 01-92-1053 CV, 1993 WL 331077, at *9 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 1993, writ requested); Almazan v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 840
S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied); Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Ha-
tridge, 831 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied); Horton v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 827 S.W.2d 361, 370 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied); Hicks v.
Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied); Mus-
quiz v. Diamond Shamrock Refining & Marketing Co., No. 04-88-00093-CV (Tex. App.-San
Antonio July 12, 1989, no writ) (not designated for publication); Lumpkin v. H & C Commu-
nications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied);
Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d at 413; Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750
S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 407;
Webber, 720 S.W.2d at 128; Berry v. Doctor's Health Facilities, 715 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); Totman v. Control Data Corp., 707 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); Vallone v. Agip Petroleum Co., 705 S.W.2d 757, 758 (Tex.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d
536, 539 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ). But see Texas Health Enters., Inc. v.
Gentry, 787 S.W.2d 604, 608 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ) (oral representation and
portion of employee handbook supported breach of contract finding). Contra Aiello v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a contract modifies at-
will rule where employee handbook included detailed procedures for discipline and discharge
and expressly recognized an obligation to discharge only for good cause).
24. Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam);
Almazan v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 840 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ
denied); Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d at 69; McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at 818.
25. Id. at 577 (citing Dallas Hotel Co. v. Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557, 561 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
26. Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992,
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tract that specifically provided that the employer did not have the right to
terminate the employment at-will and that the employment contract was in
writing if the contract exceeded one year in duration.27 Further, the writing
must limit the employer's right to terminate the employment at-will "in a
meaningful and special way."' 28 For example, employment based upon an
annual salary limits an employer's prerogative "in a meaningful and special
way" to terminate an employee during the period stated.29
2. Oral Modifications of the Employment-at- Will Doctrine
Usually, an employment relationship is created when an employee and an
employer orally agree to the terms and conditions of employment. Oral em-
ployment contracts, however, may defeat an employer's right to terminate
an employee at-will depending upon the terms of the agreement and the facts
and circumstances surrounding the employment.
An employee may avoid the at-will rule when an employer enters into an
oral agreement that the employee will be terminated only for good cause. 30
An employee may also allege that the employer's oral assurance of employ-
ment for a specified period of time (greater than one year) creates an enforce-
able contract of employment. Normally, the employer will counter this
argument by alleging that the agreement violates the statute of frauds, which
provides that an oral agreement not to be performed within one year from
the date of its making is unenforceable. 31 The duration of the oral agree-
ment determines whether the statute of frauds renders the agreement inva-
lid.32 When no period of performance is stated in an oral employment
contract, the general rule in Texas is that the statute of frauds does not apply
because the contract is performable within a year. 33 If an oral agreement
no writ) (citing Watts v. St. Mary's Hall, 662 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
27. Id. (citing Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Webber v. M. W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124,
126 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
28. Id. (quoting Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
29. Id. (citing Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1990, writ denied)) (employer's agreement to hire employee for five years at a salary of $2,000
per month limits the employer's prerogative to terminate the employee's employment except
for good cause).
30. Mansell v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 135 Tex. 31, 137 S.W.2d 997, 999-1000 (1940); Good-
year Tire and Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 836 S.W.2d 664, 667-68 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1992, writ granted) (argued Apr. 13, 1993); Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d
825, 826 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied); Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d
331, 336 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 690 S.W.2d 90, 93
(Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Booker, 5 S.W.2d
856, 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1928, no writ), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 852 (1929).
31. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. art. 26.01(a)(6) (Vernon 1987); see Morgan, 764
S.W.2d at 827; see also Rayburn v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 805 F. Supp.
1401, 1406 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
32. Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Morgan, 764
S.W.2d at 827).
33. Id. at 468 n.4; Mercer v. C. A. Roberts Co., 570 F.2d 1232, 1236 (5th Cir. 1978)
(interpreting Texas law); Miller v. Riata Cadillac Co., 517 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1974);
Bratcher, 162 Tex. 319, 321-22, 346 S.W.2d 795, 796-97 (1961); Donaubauer, 137 Tex. 473,
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can cease upon some contingency, other than by some fortuitous event or the
death of one of the parties,3 4 the agreement may be performed within one
year, and the statutes of frauds does not apply.3 5 Generally, the statute of
frauds nullifies only contracts that must last longer than one year.
36
The success of the employee's claim depends largely on the nature of the
employer's assurance.37 For example, an oral agreement for employment
until normal retirement age is unenforceable because the agreement must
last longer than one year, unless the promisee is within one year of normal
retirement age at the time the promise is made. 38 The courts are split on the
applicability of the statute of frauds to an oral promise of lifetime employ-
ment. Some cases hold that the promise of lifetime employment must be in
writing,39 while other cases conclude that such a promise does not need to be
in writing because the employee could conceivably die within one year of the
oral promise.4° The courts are also split on the applicability of the statute of
frauds to an oral promise of continued employment for as long as the prom-
isee performs his work satisfactorily. 4 1 Some cases hold that such a promise
must be in writing, 42 while other cases conclude that a writing is not re-
477, 154 S.W.2d 637, 639 (1941); Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827; Kelley v. Apache Prods., Inc.,
709 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Robertson v. Pohorelsky,
583 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
34. Hurt v. Standard Oil Co., 444 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, no
writ) (quoting Chevalier v. Lane's, Inc., 147 Tex. 106, 110, 213 S.W.2d 530, 532 (1948) (If, by
terms of oral employment agreement, its period is to extend beyond a year from date of its
making, "'the mere possibility of termination ... within a year because of death or other
fortuitous event does not render [the statute of frauds] inapplicable.' ") (quoting Chevalier v.
Lane's, Inc., 147 Tex. 106, 110, 213 S.W.2d 530, 532 (1948)).
35. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 463-64 (citing McRae v. Lindale Indep. School Dist., 450 S.W.2d
118, 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Fruth v. Gaston, 187 S.W.2d 581, 584
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945, writ rerd w.o.m.).
36. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464; Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982); Morgan,
764 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
37. Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827 (citing Niday, 643 S.W.2d at 920).
38. Crenshaw v. General Dynamics Corp., 940 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1991); Schroeder
v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc.,
750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); Benoit v. Polysar Gulf
Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Molder v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ
rerd n.r.e.); Hurt, 444 S.W.2d at 344; Green v. Texas Eastern Prods. Pipeline Co., No. H-89-
1005, slip op. at 6-7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 1991).
39. Zimmerman v. H. E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 472-73 & n.3 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 591 (1991); Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464; Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., 886
F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. Sept. 12, 1989) (not designated for publication); Rayburn, 805 F. Supp. at
1406; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coward, 829 S.W.2d 340, 342- 43 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992,
writ denied); Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Webber v. M. W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
40. Chevalier, 147 Tex. at 110-11, 213 S.W.2d at 532; Central Nat'l Bank v. Cox, 96
S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936, no writ); see also Gilliam v. Kouchoucos, 340
S.W.2d 27, 27-28 (Tex. 1960) (oral contract of employment for 10 years not excluded from
statute of frauds by provision that it would terminate upon death of employee).
41. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464-65 (applying Texas law and recognizing split of authority);
Rayburn, 805 F. Supp. at 1406 (noting conflict between Pruitt and Falconer).
42. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464-66 (holding that it was bound to follow Falconer even though
the court recognized that Falconer is contrary to Texas law); Falconer, slip op. at 8-9 (oral
agreement of employment for as long as the employee "obeyed the company rules and did his
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quired because the termination of employment could occur within a year of
the oral promise. 43 The law in this area is unclear in Texas and in the Fifth
Circuit. Hopefully, the Texas Supreme Court will have the opportunity to
resolve the confusion in the near future.
3. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Boyles v. Kerr 44 the Texas Supreme Court held that there is no general
duty in Texas not to negligently inflict emotional distress.4 5 Accordingly, to
the extent employees sue for damages for negligent infliction of emotional
distress arising out of their employment or termination of employment, such
a claim is clearly barred by Boyles v. Kerr.46 Additionally, if an employee's
emotional distress claim arises during the course and scope of his employ-
ment and the employer is a subscriber under the Workers' Compensation
Act (ACT), the employee's claim for emotional distress is barred by the Act
and his remedy is for workers' compensation benefits under the Act.47
In Farrington v. Sysco Food Services 4 8 Willie Farrington sued his former
employer after his termination alleging that he was fired for racially discrim-
inatory reasons. Sysco Food Services (Sysco) argued that it fired Farrington
after it appeared that he may have been under the influence of cocaine while
on the job. Among other things, Farrington sued for negligent infliction of
job" barred by the statute of frauds); Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275,
277 (WD. Tex. 1989) (interpreting Texas law) (oral agreement of employment so long as
employee performed satisfactorily violates statute of fraud); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 829 S.W.2d
at 342-43 (holding oral promise of job for "as long as I wanted it and made a good hand"
barred by statute of limitations).
43. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 836 S.W.2d at 669-70; McRae, 450 S.W.2d at 124;
Hardison v. A. H. Belo Corp., 247 S.W.2d 167, 168-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, no writ).
See also Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 690 S.W.2d 90, 91-93 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (plaintiff stated cause of action for breach of express employment contract by
alleging that his at-will status was modified by oral agreements with supervisory personnel that
he would not be terminated except for good cause and that his employment would continue so
long as his work was satisfactory).
44. 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
45. Id. at 594.
46. See the following, all standing for the proposition that no cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress arises out of termination of employment: Brunnemann v. Terra
Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 175, 180-81 (5th Cir. 1992); Conaway v. Control Data Corp., 955 F.2d
358, 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 186 (1992); Mayon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co.,
805 F.2d 1250, 1253 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986); Geise v. The Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., No. H-91-
2703 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 1993); White v. H.S. Fox Corp., No. 3:92-CV-0628-H (N.D. Tex. Jan.
14, 1993); Clayton v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 882, 886 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Austin v.
Champion Int'l Corp., No. H-87-1845, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6761, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 2,
1992); Soto v. City of Laredo, 764 F. Supp. 454, 457 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Taylor v. Houston
Lighting and Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 301-02 (S.D. Tex. 1990); Sauls v. Union Oil Co. of
Calif., 750 F. Supp. 783, 790 (E.D. Tex. 1990); Nichols v. Columbia Gas Dev., No. 89-2418
(S.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 1990); Williams v. Sealed Power Corp., No. 4-88-254-E, 1990 WL 102799,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. 1990); Fiorenza v. First City Bank-Central, 710 F. Supp. 1104, 1105 (E.D.
Tex. 1988). See generally McAlister v. Medina Elec. Co-op., Inc., 830 S.W.2d 659, 662-63
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied) (discharged employee's claim for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress preempted by Workers' Compensation Act).
47. Schauer v. Memorial Care Sys., 856 S.W.2d 437, 452 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1993, no writ); McAlister v. Medina Elec. Co-op., Inc., 830 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1992, writ denied).
48. 856 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
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emotional distress. The trial court granted Sysco's motion for summary
judgment and the court of appeals affirmed, 49 citing Boyles v. Kerr.5"
In Schauer v. Memorial Care System 51 the plaintiff-employee filed suit
against her employer after she was denied a supervisory position and was
given only a "fair" rating in an employment performance appraisal. The
plaintiff asserted several claims, including libel and intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judgment
for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. Specifically, the plaintiff as-
serted that the trial court erred by refusing to allow her to recover for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress. The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's decision, however, noting that the Texas Workers' Compensation
Act (Act)5 2 precludes employees of subscribers from recovering in tort for
damages resulting from the negligence of their employers. 53 The court de-
termined that because the plaintiff's employer subscribed to the Act, the
plaintiff's only remedy for this claim fell under workers' compensation bene-
fits. 54 Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's granting of
summary judgment on the issue of negligent infliction of emotional
distress.55
In Doe v. Smithkline Beecham Corp. 56 Jane Doe sued Smithkline Beecham
Corporation and The Quaker Oats Company for allegedly conducting pre-
employment drug testing in a negligent manner. In Doe, the plaintiff was
offered employment with Quaker Oats contingent on passing a drug test.
When the plaintiff took the test, however, the results indicated that the
plaintiff had recently consumed narcotics, and Quaker rescinded its employ-
ment offer. The plaintiff asserted that the test was faulty and that she had
not taken any illegal drugs. When Quaker refused to permit a retest, the
plaintiff filed suit against both Quaker and the testing laboratory, alleging
that the defendants negligently conducted the drug test. The plaintiff further
asserted that because of this negligence, she experienced severe emotional
distress. The trial court entered summary judgment for the defendants and
the plaintiff appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. 57 The court noted
that no cause of action exists for negligent infliction of emotional distress
arising from contractual relationships. 58 The court reasoned that a plaintiff
may recover for mental anguish in breach of contract cases only if the de-
fendant breaches some other duty imposed by law. 59 The court then con-
cluded that the negligence claim against Quaker arose out of the agreement
49. Id. at 250.
50. 855 S.W.2d at 593 (Tex. 1993).
51. 856 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).




56. 855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ granted) (argued Mar. 8, 1994).
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between Quaker and Doe.6° The claim resulted from an alleged breach of a
contractual duty, rather than a legal duty. 61 Therefore, the court held that
the plaintiff could not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.62
4. Intentional Infliction of Severe Emotional Distress
Under Texas law, to prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, the Texas Supreme Court, 63 the federal district courts64 and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 65 have consistently
required plaintiffs to establish a level of conduct that is "extreme and outra-
geous" as that term is defined in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. 66




63. Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 743 (Tex. 1993) (observing that in Twyman v.
Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993) the supreme court adopted the elements of the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress as set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 (1965)); Diamond Shamrock Refining and Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198,
200 (Tex. 1992).
64. Jefferson v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., No. H-91-008, slip op. at 18-19 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 29, 1993); Hoinski v. General Elec. Corp., No. 3:91-CV-1034-G (N.D. Dec. 4, 1992);
Anderson v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., No. 3:91-CV-1489-G (N.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 1992); Gar-
cia v. Pepsi-Bottling Group, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 464 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 1992);
Garcia v. Webb, 764 F. Supp. 457, 460 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Lucas v. Columbia Gas Dev. Corp.,
No. 89-2175 (S.D. Tex. May 9, 1991); Young v. Dow Chem. Co., No. H-90-1145, 1991 WL
138322, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 1991); Davis v. Exxon Co., No. H-89-2806 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 28,
1991); Green v. Texas E. Prods. Pipeline Co., No. 89-1005 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 1991); Hoose v.
T.I.R.R., No. H-90-2153 (S.D. Tex. June 10, 1991); Taylor v. Houston Lighting and Power
Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 301 (S.D. Tex. 1990); Koehler v. Houston Lighting and Power Co., No.
H-89-909 (S.D. Tex. 1990); Perez v. Airco Carbon Group, Inc., No. C-88-13, 1990 WL
128231, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 1990); Castillo v. Horton Automatics, No. C-88-199 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 23, 1990); Williams v. Sealed Power Corp., No. 4-88-254-E, 1990 WL 102797, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 1990); Benavides v. Woodforest Nat'l Bank, No. H-87-3094 (S.D. Tex. Oct.
12, 1989); In re Continental Airlines, Corp., 64 B.R. 858, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); Scott v.
Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 89-1839, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 1990); Guzman v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 756 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (W.D. Tex. 1990); Nichols v. Columbia Gas Dev.
Corp., No. 89-2418 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 1990); Ismail v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., No. 90-1817 (S.D.
Tex. Nov. 2, 1990); Austin v. Champion Int'l Corp., No. H-87-1845, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6761, at *9 (S.D. Tex. 1990); Starrett v. Iberia Airlines of Spain, 756 F. Supp. 292, 296 (S.D.
Tex. 1989); Yarbrough v. La Petite Academy, No. H-87-3967 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 1989); Fi-
orenza v. First City Bank-Central, 710 F. Supp. 1104, 1105 (E.D. Tex. 1988); Laird v. Texas
Commerce Bank-Odessa, 707 F. Supp. 938, 941 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Abston v. Levi Strauss &
Co., 684 F. Supp. 152, 157 (E.D. Tex. 1987).
65. See Grizzle v. Travelers Health Network, Inc., 14 F.3d 261, 269 n.28 (5th Cir. 1994);
Oldham v. Western Ag-Minerals Co., No. 93-2440, slip op. at 5 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 1994);
Danawala v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 4 F.3d 989, slip op. 2676 (5th Cir. 1993) (not for
publication); Johnson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 965 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir. 1992);
Ramirez v. Allright Parking El Paso, Inc., 970 F.2d 1372, 1375 (5th Cir. 1992); Guthrie v.
Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1267 (1992); Wilson v.
Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1991); Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885
F.2d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Prunty v. Arkansas Freightways, Inc., 16 F.3d 649 (5th
Cir. 1994).
66. Liability for outrageous conduct exists
only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case
in which outrageous conduct is found is one in which the recitation of the facts
1994] 1067
SMU LAW REVIEW
that an ordinary discharge will not support a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 67 In Wornick Co. v. CasaS68 Diana Casas sued her
employer claiming, among other things, intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Casas, the director of human resources, was approached by her
supervisor, Valerie Woerner, in the hall and asked to come to her office
Upon arriving in Woerner's office, Casas was informed that she was being
terminated. The door was closed and no one else was present at the meeting.
Casas was terminated for exhibiting disloyalty to the company, exhibiting a
bad attitude by "snapping at people," and failing to perform certain assigned
tasks. However, prior to this time, Casas had received favorable job per-
formance reviews. Casas believed that she was terminated to prevent her
from revealing information to government auditors concerning unethical
practices of other employees. Woerner refused Casas' request for further
explanation and told her to leave the property immediately. Cases was ap-
proached by a security guard who explained that he was there to escort her
off of the premises. Casas then saw the president of the company, Bill Barth,
and asked to speak to him. The two went to Barth's office where Casas
explained what had just occurred. Casas disputed the allegations and Barth
told her not to say or do anything and that they would discuss the matter
when he returned from a trip. The security officer and Casas then proceeded
to Casas' office where the security supervisor was waiting. The supervisor
gave Casas a box to pack her belongings. Another person then came to the
office and told the security supervisor that Woerner wanted Casas off of the
property in five minutes. The security supervisor carried Casas' belongings
to her car, and Casas drove away. Neither of the security guards were offen-
sive to Casas in any manner. While it was company policy to escort hourly
employees off of the premises, it was not policy to escort salaried employees
off of the premises. Barth's promised meeting with Casas never materialized
and Casas was not allowed to return to the company premises.
The trial court granted Wornick's motion for summary judgment, but the
court of appeals reversed.69 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of
to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against
the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!".
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppression, or other trivialities .... [T]he rough edges of our society are still in
need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must necessar-
ily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough lan-
guage, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind.
There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where someone's
feelings are hurt. There must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion,
and some safety valve must be left through which irascible tempers may blow off
relatively harmless steam.
Id.
67. W. Wendell Hall & Philip J. Pfeiffer, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 1393, 1409-10 (1993) (correctly predicting the supreme court's
holding in Casas).
68. 856 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1993).
69. 818 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991) (Nye, C.J., dissenting).
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appeals and affirmed the summary judgment for the employer.70 The
supreme court recited the elements of the intentional infliction of emotional
distress cause of action recently recognized in Twyman v. Twyman:7 1 (1)
intentional or reckless action by the defendant; (2) the action constituted
extreme and outrageous conduct; (3) the plaintiff suffered emotional distress;
and (4) the distress was severe. 72 After considering the evidence, the
supreme court concluded that as a matter of law the employer's behavior did
not constitute "outrageous conduct."' 73 The court relied on the RESTATE-
MENT'S definition of "outrageous conduct:" that conduct which goes "be-
yond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community."' 74 The court also held that it is
a question of law for the court to determine in the first instance whether the
defendant's conduct is extreme and outrageous. 75 The court concluded that
"[i]n exercising its rights as an employer-at-will" Wornick's "conduct as a
matter of law did not 'exceed all possible bounds of decency' and was not
'utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' ",76 Because Wornick was sim-
ply exercising its legal rights, its conduct was not outrageous as a matter of
law.77
The court distinguished cases cited by the National Employment Lawyers
Association because those cases "involved repeated or ongoing harassment
of an employee" which supported a finding of outrageous conduct. 78 The
court noted that while "[t]ermination of an employee is never pleasant, espe-
cially for the employee," if Casas' argument was accepted virtually every
employer would be subjected to a potential jury trial in connection with
every discharge and " 'there would be little left of the employment-at-will
doctrine.' ,,79
70. 856 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1993).
71. 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
72. Casas, 856 S.W.2d at 734 (citing Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 621). In Borden, Inc. v.
Rios, 850 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi), writ granted in part without reference to the
merits, judgments of the court of appeals and trial court vacated, cause remanded to trial court
for entry of judgment pursuant to the settlement agreement, 859 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. 1993), the
court of appeals held that "severe" in the context of intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress is a term of special legal meaning which should be defined for the jury. Id. at 832.
73. Casas, 856 S.W.2d at 734.
74. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
75. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h (1965)).
76. Id. at 735.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 735-36. This is consistent with this author's analysis of the cases in the amicus
curaie brief filed on behalf of the Texas Association of Business.
79. Id. (quoting Diamond Shamrock Refining and Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198,
202 (Tex. 1992)). Justice Hecht wrote a compelling concurrence in which he lamented the
court's failure to articulate any principles for concluding that the Wornick's conduct was not
outrageous as a matter of law. Id. at 736-37 (Hecht, J., concurring). As Justice Hecht stated:
With the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court embarks
on what I predict will be an endless wandering over a sea of factual circum-
stances, meandering this way and that, blown about by bias and inclination, and
guided by nothing steadier than the personal preferences of the helmsmen, who




In Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. 80 Robert Bernard, senior
litigation counsel for Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. (BFI) sued BFI for
intentional infliction of emotional distress alleging that the hostile work envi-
ronment created by BFI caused him severe emotional distress. Bernard con-
tended that the following evidence raised a fact issue regarding his claim:
Bernard's supervisor said a man of his age should not be driving a motorcy-
cle, and he asked Bernard "[h]ow old are you? A man of your age, title and
position should not be wearing saddle shoes and plaid trousers I did not put
that in the memo because I knew you would sue my ass.;" Bernard was
placed on probation; Bernard's supervisors told him that he reminded them
of the old man in The Caine Mutiny, Captain Queeg; Bernard's supervisor
called him a "fucking asshole;" and Bernard was given a birthday card from
legal staff and attached to the card was a button that read "over the hill."
The trial court granted BFI's motion for summary judgment, and the
court of appeals affirmed. The court held that determining whether BFI's
conduct was extreme and outrageous was a question of law for the court.,"
On that basis, the trial court concluded that Bernard's sensitivity to the
"over the hill" birthday card and the and the profanity did not constitute
extreme and outrageous conduct as a matter of law.8 2
In Garcia v. Andrews 83 Delayne Garcia sued her former manager and boss
for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on three incidents: (1)
the day that she was hired her manager observed her from top to bottom,
making her feel as though he was undressing her and making her very un-
comfortable; (2) her manager once came in her office and turned her lights
off and on and asked if she did her best work in the dark; and (3) her man-
ager once told her of a magazine he and his wife had brought home telling of
the different sizes ad shapes of men and what they did right or wrong "in the
sack," leaving her "wordless and embarrassed." The trial court granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals af-
firmed. The court held that the manager's conduct, even if accepted as true,
did not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct as a matter of law.84
Garcia urged the court to adopt a "reasonable woman" standard to deter-
mine what constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct in cases of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress in which sexual harassment occurs. 85
The court declined Garcia's suggestion, stating that
[e]xisting policy is concerned not only with safeguarding freedom of
expression, but also with the even-handed disposition of all claims with-
out regard to whether the plaintiff is a woman or a man, is young or old,
or is a member of any one of numerous and varied sub-groups in our
80. No. 01-92-00134-CV, 1993 WL 414700 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 14,
1993, motion for rehearing pending).
81. Id. at *7 (citing Horton v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 827 S.W.2d 361, 369 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied)).
82. Id.
83. 867 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
84. Id. at 412.
85. Id.
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society, each, possibly, with its own standard of decency.86
Accordingly, the court held that fairness dictated that there be one societal
standard for liability: where the conduct goes "beyond all possible bounds of
decency and [is] to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civi-
lized society."'87
In Reeves v. Western Co. of North America 88 James Reeves sued the West-
ern Company of North America (WCNA) for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress arising out of application for employment with the company.
Reeves applied for a sales position with WCNA. His employment was con-
ditioned on passing a physical examination and a drug and alcohol screening
test. Reeves agreed and signed a "consent to toxicology tests" form. The
test results came back and were positive for alcohol. The company told
Reeves that the alcohol content was .40%, when in fact the figure was .04%.
Reeves denied having had any alcohol and asked the company to investigate
further. A second confirmatory test was performed and it again showed pos-
itive alcohol results. Reeves was not informed of the second letter. The jury
rendered a verdict for Reeves, but the trial court granted WCNA's motion
for judgment n.o.v. and entered judgment for WCNA. The court of appeals
affirmed. The court held that the evidence failed to establish the element of
"extreme and outrageous" conduct by WCNA. 89 The court reasoned that
simply because Reeves, a mere job applicant, disputes the reason for his non-
employment, contending that the results were inaccurate because he denied
consuming any alcohol, that reason and denial cannot be some evidence that
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has been committed. 90
The court added that WCNA exercised its legal rights in a permissible way,
therefore, WCNA could not be liable for emotional distress.9'
In Farrington v. Sysco Food Services 92 Willie Farrington sued Sysco Food
Services (Sysco) for intentional infliction of emotional distress after he was
terminated. The basis of Farrington's claim was Sysco's requirement that
Farrington take a drug and polygraph test and his subsequent termination.
The trial court granted Sysco's motion for summary judgment and the court
of appeals affirmed.9 3 The court first observed that termination by itself is
insufficient to support his claim. 94 Additionally, Farrington consented to
the drug and polygraph tests, therefore, the court held that taking the tests
could not support his claim. 95 Because there was no evidence to support his
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court affirmed the
summary judgment.96
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
88. 867 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ requested).
89. Id. at 392.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (1965)).
92. 865 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ requested).
93. Id. at 254.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 250.
96. Id. at 254.
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In Qualicare v. Runnels97 three individuals employed by Qualicare of East
Texas (Qualicare) left Qualicare and established a competing home health
care business. While employed by Qualicare, the evidence reflected that the
defendants were subjected to threats, surveillance, hang-up phone calls and
received a black floral arrangement. The defendants testified that Qualicare
instructed them to forge names, change nurses notes and change patient
records to insure Medicare reimbursement. One defendant "totally de-
graded" her and was threatened with review of her nursing license in Austin.
Another defendant was threatened and told that she would be ruined in the
community and told to always watch her children. Qualicare sued the three
individuals (defendants) and the defendants counterclaimed against Quali-
care for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury found for the
defendants and Qualicare appealed contending there was legally and factu-
ally insufficient evidence to support the finding.
On appeal Qualicare contested the jury finding that its conduct was ex-
treme and outrageous and that the defendants' emotional distress was not
severe. The court reasoned that based on the RESTATEMENT, threats and
practical jokes may constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. 98 In addi-
tion, the court found that severe emotional distress can be "highly unpleas-
ant emotional reactions" such as humiliation, fright, anger, embarrassment,
worry and nausea. 99 The defendants' testimony that the harassment made
her paranoid, that her migraine headaches became debilitating, that she was
angry, and that her blood pressure increased dramatically was sufficient to
establish severe emotional distress.'0°
In Johnson v. Randall's Food Markets '0' Mary Lynn Johnson was termi-
nated from employment after she allegedly stole a Christmas wreath from
her employer, Randall's. Johnson filed suit against her former employer
claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted
summary judgment for Randall's and Johnson appealed. Johnson argued
that she presented a fact issue that she suffered severe emotional distress as a
result of her former employer's accusations during an interview regarding
the incident. The evidence reflected that during Johnson's interview with
Randall's about the incident, Johnson stated that she forgot to pay for the
wreath. She was told that she would be suspended for thirty days and then
given the option of working at another Randall's. Johnson was not referred
to as a thief nor was she accused of stealing during the interview nor was
anyone's voice raised. Johnson, however, did cry at times and appeared
afraid. The court held (incorrectly) that this created a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact regarding severe emotional distress.' 0 2
97. 863 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, writ dism'd).
98. Id. at 222 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
99. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT § 46 cmt j).
100. Id. at 223 (citing American Medical Int'l, Ins. v. Giurintano, 821 S.W.2d 331, 343
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ)).
101. No. 01-92-1053-CV, 1993 WL 331077 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31,
1993, writ requested).
102. Id. at *6. The court's holding that "crying" and being "afraid" constitutes severe
emotional distress cannot be reconciled with Casas and Mendez.
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In Schauer v. Memorial Care Systems 103 Helen Schauer sued her em-
ployer after she was denied a supervisory position and was given only a
"fair" rating in an employment performance appraisal. Schauer asserted
several claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
trial court granted summary judgment to Schauer's employer, concluding
that the evidence did not support her claim. Schauer appealed. The court of
appeals noted that Schauer's claim for emotional distress was based on the
performance appraisal which she contended was defamatory. 1°4 However,
the appraisal was made pursuant to a hospital policy, Schauer received no
negative repercussions from the appraisal, and its contents were not commu-
nicated to anyone other than her immediate supervisor. 10 5 Therefore, the
court concluded that the defendant's actions were not outrageous., 0 6 The
court also held that whether Schauer's distress is sufficiently severe is a ques-
tion of law for the court. 10 7 The court concluded that the evidence simply
did not support Schauer's claim that her distress was severe.10 8 With two
elements of the cause of action disproven, the court affirmed the summary
judgment. 109
In Amador v. Tan 110 Beatrice Amador was a waitress at Red Lobster Res-
taurant, which was managed by Ian Frederick Tan and owned by General
Mills. Upon termination of her employment, Amador sued Tan and Gen-
eral Mills for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Amador contended
that she was terminated because Tan disliked her and because she had coun-
seled Tan's girlfriend, a fellow waitress, not to have an abortion. Tan and
General Mills filed special exceptions to Amador's pleadings, and Amador
amended her pleadings. Nevertheless, the trial court found that Amador did
not state a cause of action for which she could recover, and the court dis-
missed the case.
On appeal, Amador argued that she presented a fact issue as to her emo-
tional distress claim. The court disagreed, concluding that the defendants'
behavior was not outrageous; and, therefore, an essential element of
Amador's cause of action was absent." 'I The court explained that a public
statement by an employer of the reason for the termination, by itself, is not
outrageous behavior. 1 2 Also, retaliatory actions, like those of Tan, are not
outrageous.11 3 The court further reasoned that harassing conduct, alone, is
not sufficient to satisfy the "outrageous" requirement. 114
103. 856 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).








110. 855 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied).






In Hennigan v. LP. Petroleum Co. 115 Lois Hennigan and her husband
worked for the same employer at the same facility. Lois filed for divorce
against her husband and obtained a restraining order, preventing the hus-
band from "going about" the employer's facility. The day after Lois served
her husband with the restraining order, Lois' employer terminated her. Lois
then filed suit, claiming, among other things, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer
and Lois appealed.
On appeal, Lois argued that her employer's actions were retaliatory in
nature because she was not discharged until she had the divorce petition
served upon her husband; the termination was sex discrimination; the con-
duct was outrageous because she did nothing wrong with reference to her
employer and she received little or no support from her husband; and the
conduct was outrageous because her husband and agents of her employer
conspired to discharge her. Because the record contained no conduct in-
dependent of the termination of employment and no evidence that the termi-
nation was affected in an extreme and outrageous manner. 16
In Benavides v. Moore 117 Charlene Benavides sued her former employer
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals
affirmed." 8 The court observed that a plaintiff must establish that the de-
fendant acted recklessly or intentionally, the action was outrageous and ex-
treme, the plaintiff suffered emotional distress, and the distress was severe. " 9
The court focused on the last element, and considered whether Benavides'
distress was severe. 120 The court noted that Benavides had not seen any
psychiatrists or psychologists and did not intend to seek any treatment.' 2'
The summary judgment evidence showed that Benavides became stressed
when she was asked questions concerning her termination, but had quickly
found other employment.' 22 Other than this evidence, the court found that
Benavides did not present any direct proof concerning the severity of her
distress, and did not submit an affidavit attesting to her anguish and stress in
response to the motion for summary judgment. 23 Viewing the record on
appeal, then, the court determined that Benavides did not raise a fact issue
as to the severity of her distress and affirmed the summary judgment. 124
In McKethan v. Texas Farm Bureau 125 Fred McKethan, an insurance or-
115. 848 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Beaumont), rev'd on other grounds, 858 S.W.2d 371
(Tex. 1993).
116. Id. (citing Diamond Shamrock Refining and Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198
(Tex. 1992)).
117. 848 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
118. Id. at 196.
119. Id. at 195.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 195-96.
123. Id. at 196.
124. Id.
125. 996 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1993).
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ganization district sales manager, brought suit for intentional infliction of
emotional distress against his employer for "cutting comments" made by the
presenter at an awards ceremony. At the awards ceremony, approximately
700 people were in attendance. When it was McKethan's turn for recogni-
tion, the presenter told McKethan to stand up, but then said, "[s]it down,
you don't have anything, you haven't done anything to be recognized for;"
that he "never had a master agent and never would have one." The remarks
lasted one to two minutes and McKethan stated that he felt like he had been
"pleaxed with a four-by-four." McKethan then had a characteristic "red
stripe" in the middle of his forehead (caused by his anger) for the remainder
of the evening. Later, McKethan located the presenter and told him, with-
out laughter, that he ought to kill him. After playing poker for about one
hour, McKethan went to bed. When he awoke the next morning, McK-
ethan testified that he "terribly upset;" that his credibility had been ruined;
that he had to go to the bathroom seven times with an upset stomach; that
he couldn't face his agents; and that he was returning home from the con-
vention. Approximately two weeks later, McKethan told his company that
he planned to retire in thirteen months. The district court granted the com-
pany's motion for a directed verdict upon the close of McKethans's evi-
dence. McKethan appealed, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Examining the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Wornick Co. v.
Casas,126 the Fifth Circuit held that the conduct at issue was less extreme
than in Casas.127 The court observed that the comments lasted only mo-
ments and that the comments, at worst, conveyed the message that Mck-
ethan had not earned recognition, whereas in Casas, the comments indicated
incompetence or misconduct. 128 The court also noted that its decisions prior
to Casas compelled the same result. 129 The court held that an "ordinary
employment dispute rises to the level of outrageous conduct under Texas law
where there is evidence of intentional and systematic degradation and humil-
iation, or reprehensible conduct that is utterly intolerable in a civilized
community."1 30
The court also held that McKethan failed to demonstrate that his distress
was severe. 131 While the court observed that the Texas Supreme Court has
not analyzed the severity requirement, the court noted that the courts of
appeals have held that the plaintiff must present evidence that his distress
was so severe that " 'no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.' "132
The court held that McKethan's stomach problems and his conclusory testi-
126. 856 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1993).
127. McKethan, 996 F.2d at 742.
128. Id.
129. Id. at n.22.
130. Id. (citing Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1145 (5th Cir. 1991); Dean
v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1989)).
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting K.B. v. N.B., 811 S.W.2d 634, 640 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ




mony regarding his self-diagnosed depression was insufficient to create a fact
issue for the jury.
In Chance v. Rice University 133 Dr. Jane Chance, a full professor of Eng-
lish at Rice University, filed suit against a supervisor for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Over several years, Chance complained to her
superiors that she was not being paid at a level commensurate with her male
colleagues and was not being afforded the same opportunities for advance-
ment. When Rice did not respond to the plaintiff's satisfaction, she filed suit
alleging, among other things, a claim against Dr. Grob (chairman of the
English department) for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The fed-
eral district court directed a verdict for Grob and Chance appealed. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed. 1 34 The court held that while Chance introduced evi-
dence of depression, sleeplessness, and derogatory comments made by Grob,
the evidence did not show that Grob acted intentionally or recklessly. 135
Simply, there was no evidence to support Chance's claim. 136
After reviewing the evidence, the appellate court found the directed ver-
dict was proper.1 37 The court explained that there was no evidence that Dr.
Grob's alleged harmful actions were intentional or reckless. 138 Also, the
court reasoned that the plaintiff suffered from several problems, and that any
one of these could have caused the plaintiff's distress. 139 Therefore, the
court affirmed the directed verdict. 14 0
In Ugalde v. W. A. McKenzie Asphalt Co. 141 Artemio Ugalde, an asphalt
paving machine operator on a work crew, became upset and walked off the
job after his supervisor called him a "Mexican" and a "wetback" and told
him to start using a shovel, rather than the paving machine because he was
not American. At first Ugalde did not report to management the objectiona-
ble comments. Also, several days later, Ugalde returned to pick up his
paycheck and also refused the employer's offer to reinstate Ugalde at a lower
pay level and to transfer him to another work crew. About a week later,
Ugalde was offered reinstatement at his original rate of pay, but he declined.
Instead, Ugalde filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and eventually filed suit against his former employer, claiming
constructive discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After
the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, Ugalde
appealed.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 142 The court observed that the only conduct
alleged to be extreme and outrageous to support his claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress was that a supervisor referred to Ugalde over
133. 984 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1993).
134. Id. at 154.
135. Id. at 153-54.
136. Id. at 154.




141. 990 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1993).
142. Id. at 243.
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a period of time as a "wetback" and as a "Mexican."' 43 While the court
condemned the supervisor's conduct, the court observed that "mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, or petty oppressions"' 144 do not rise to the
level of being outrageous behavior; therefore, the court concluded that the
conduct was not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law.' 45
In Clayton v. Nabisco Brands, Inc. 146 Rodney Clayton sued his employer
alleging several causes of action, including intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Clayton alleged that his employer often yelled at him, reprimanded
him for conduct for which he was not responsible, called a "damn liar,"
attempted to prove plaintiff's on-the-job injury was not work related, and
tried to force others to state that the plaintiff participated in misconduct or
negligent work performance. In addition, Clayton presented evidence that
he had suffered from headaches since the events in question began. The em-
ployer moved for partial summary judgment and the district court granted
the motion. The court reasoned that based on case law, an employer acts
outrageously if it puts an innocent employee in fear of being accused of a
crime. 147 In addition, an employer acts outrageously if it humiliates an em-
ployee such that the employee is painfully and totally embarrassed, and this
humiliation leads to several emotional or physical trauma. 14 8 The court also
noted case law indicating that demotion, other than demotions from man-
agement positions to menial duties; extreme hostility; constant criticism; and
wrongful accusations are not necessarily considered outrageous behavior. 49
Applying this analysis to the facts, the court .found that the summary judg-
ment evidence did not create a fact issue as to an essential element of an
emotional distress cause of action.' 5 0 Specifically, the court concluded the
evidence did not establish a fact issue as to whether the employer's behavior
was outrageous.'5 1 The court reasoned that the fact that Clayton only spo-
radically visited his doctor for treatment of headaches, and last visited the
doctor more than a year and a half before being terminated, indicated that
the employer's conduct was not so outrageous that the plaintiff was suffering
emotional trauma. 152 Rather, the court characterized the Clayton's evi-
dence as "commonplace work-related disputes," and not outside the bounds
of decency. ' 53
In Oldham v. Western Ag-Minerals Co. 154 Dale Oldham worked as con-
troller for Western Ag-Minerals Co. (Western). Following a business trip to
143. Id. at 240.
144. Id. at 243 (citing Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1991)).
145. Id.
146. 804 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
147. Id. at 886 (citing Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1989)).
148. Id. (citing Wilson, 939 F.2d at 1138).
149. Id. at 886-87 (citing Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1991); Johnson v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 965 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1992); and Ramirez v. Allright




153. Id. at 888.
154. No. 93-2440 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 1994) (not designated for publication).
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New Mexico, Oldham did not report to work or call in to the office until
after noon on the day after he returned. Oldham admitted that he was
drinking heavily the night before and overslept. Oldham also revealed that
he was an alcoholic. Oldham was told that another such incident would
result in his discharge. The next summer, Oldham began to drink again,
experienced blackouts, displayed unusual behavior, and his work perform-
ance suffered. Before his employer could meet with him, Oldham was in jail
for driving while under the influence of alcohol. After his release, Oldham
was told that he could either seek professional treatment or be fired. Old-
ham chose to undergo treatment and his wife was assured that he would not
be fired if he entered the treatment facility. Shortly before he was to return
to work, Western terminated Oldham's employment. Oldham sued Western
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Western moved for summary
judgment and the federal district court granted the motion. The Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed. The court held that Western terminated him while he was in
residential treatment which the court found did not constitute extreme and
outrageous conduct.155 The court observed that Western's actions were not
extreme and outrageous as a matter of law as required under Texas law.15 6
5. Drug Testing
In Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. 157 The Quaker Oats Company
(Quaker Oats) withdrew a job offer given to Jane Doe after Doe tested posi-
tive for the presence of opiates in a pre-employment drug screening test.
Doe brought suit against Quaker and SmithKline Beecham Corporation
(SmithKline), the drug testing laboratory, alleging that Quaker and
SmithKline were negligent in their failure to warn her to refrain from poppy
seed consumption before the test or to inquire about consumption of poppy
seeds on the pretesting questionnaire, negligent in their failure to properly
review her test results or to conduct additional tests to determine whether
the tests indicated poppy seed consumption rather than illegal drug use, and
negligent in their failure to retain and return her urine sample properly. Doe
also alleged that Quaker Oats breached the employment contract by failing
to provide her with a reasonable opportunity to pass the drug test and that
Quaker Oats was negligent. In addition, Doe alleged that SmithKline tor-
tiously interfered with her contract with Quaker Oats. 158 The trial court
granted summary judgment to Quaker Oats and SmithKline, and Doe
appealed.
With respect to Doe's negligence claims, the court of appeals reversed the
summary judgment as to SmithKline. 159 The court held that SmithKline
owed a duty to Doe because it created a possibility of misinterpretation of
155. Id., slip op. 5.
156. Id. (citing Horton v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 827 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1992, writ denied)).
157. 855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ granted) (argued Mar. 8, 1994).
158. Id. at 252. Doe also sought damages against SmithKline and Quaker Oats for defa-
mation. See infra notes 226-35 and accompanying text.
159. Id. at 256.
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test results by making representations that implied the infallibility of its tests
and by failing to provide any information regarding the possible implications
of the raw test results.' 60 Furthermore, the court found that SmithKline
owed a duty to Doe because SmithKline destroyed Doe's urine sample con-
trary to Doe's instructions.' 6' Construing all disputed facts and inferences
in favor of Doe, the court concluded that Doe established the proximate
cause element of its negligence claims against SmithKline by showing that
but for SmithKline's failure to provide some safeguards or additional infor-
mation, Doe would not have consumed poppy seeds and would not have
failed her drug test, and that but for Doe's positive test result, Quaker Oats
would not have revoked the job offer. 16 2 The court was not persuaded that
SmithKline should be absolved of liability based on an Illinois law prohibit-
ing SmithKline from interpreting the raw test results, concluding that
SmithKline was obligated to provide sufficient information regarding possi-
ble test anomalies to prevent the misleading perception that a positive drug
test exclusively indicates illegal drug use. 163
The court of appeals also reversed the trial court's summary judgment as
to Doe's claim that SmithKline tortiously interfered with her contract with
Quaker Oats, explaining that a prospective contract for employment-at-will
can give rise to a tortious interference claim. 164 More importantly, however,
SmithKline apparently raised no grounds specifically attacking Doe's tor-
tious interference with contract claim.' 65
With respect to Doe's breach of contract claim against Quaker Oats, the
court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment. 166 The court explained
that because Doe was employed at-will, Quaker Oats would have been able
to terminate her without breaching the contract if Doe had failed a drug test
for any reason after starting her job. 167 The court saw no reason to place
greater contractual duties on Quaker Oats in a pre-employment situation.16 8
The court of appeals also affirmed the trial court's summary judgment as
to Doe's negligence claim against Quaker Oats. 169 The court rejected Doe's
claim that Quaker Oats owed to Doe "a tort duty in addition to its obliga-
tions under the contract."' 70 The court observed that in determining the
nature of Doe's claim, the court looked to the nature of the loss or damage




163. Id. at 256-57.
164. Id. at 258.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 254-55.
167. Id. at 254.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 257-58.
170. Id. at 257 (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 146 Tex. 153, 157, 204
S.W.2d 508, 510 (1947)).
171. Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coward, 829 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1992, writ denied); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 92 at 656-58 (5th ed. 1984)).
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Because Doe's alleged loss was her expected earnings as a Quaker Oats em-
ployee, Doe's claim sounded in contract only.172 Therefore, Quaker Oats
owed no tort duty to Doe. 173
The court also addressed the argument raised by Quaker Oats and
SmithKline that they were protected from liability by the release, waiver and
indemnity provisions of a consent form signed by Doe. 174 Because the court
determined that Quaker Oats was not liable as a matter of law on each of
Doe's causes of action, the court declined to determine whether the release
was enforceable as to Quaker Oats. 175 The court determined, however, that
the release was unenforceable to shield SmithKline from liability from Doe's
negligence and tortious interference with contract claims.1 76 The court
noted that the release may well be void as a matter of public policy based on
the disparity of bargaining power in the parties' relationship.177 The court
concluded, however, that even if the release were not void on the basis of
public policy, the release was not an effective release of liability because it
did not satisfy the requirements of the express-negligence doctrine. 178
Under the express-negligence doctrine, which had previously been applied
only to indemnity agreements and not to releases, the agreement must ex-
pressly state that it applies to negligence to be effective as a release of such
liability. 179 Because the waiver signed by Doe did not expressly release lia-
bility for negligence, it did not constitute an effective release of SmithKline
from liability for negligence.'8 0 Finally, the court noted that SmithKline
was not protected by the terms of the waiver because SmithKline was
neither expressly named in the waiver nor an agent of Quaker Oats, but
appeared to be an independent contractor.' 8 '
In Reeves v. Western Co. of North America 182 James Reeves sued the
Western Company of North America (WCNA) for negligence and gross
negligence arising out of a drug and alcohol test that was a condition of
employment with WCNA. Reeves, who applied for a sales position with
WCNA, agreed to the test and signed a "consent to toxicology tests" form.
After taking the test, the test results came back and were positive for alco-
hol. WCNA told Reeves that the alcohol content was .40%, when in fact
the figure was .04%. Reeves denied having had any alcohol and asked the
company to investigate further. A second confirmatory test was performed
172. Id.
173. Id. at 257-58.
174. Id. at 253-54. The release read: "I consent to the release of the drug screen results to
authorized Quaker representatives for appropriate review. I release and agree to hold harmless
Quaker, its employees and its agents, from any liability to me based on the results of the drug
screening." Id. at 253.
175. Id. at 254.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 253 (citing Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex.
1987)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 254.
181. Id.
182. 867 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ requested).
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and it again showed positive alcohol results, although it indicated that the
alcohol content might be caused by an alternative source (microbial break-
down of sugar). Reeves was not informed of the second letter. Reeves con-
tended that WCNA was negligent in the manner in which is secured, tested
and/or reported the test results of the urine sample, that WCNA's negli-
gence was the proximate cause of his damages, and that WCNA was grossly
negligent. Reeves claimed that a duty existed under "general common law
concepts and sound public policy" 83 to fully and non-negligently report the
test results to him.' 8 4 Reeves also contended that even if no duty existed
from the outset, WCNA owed a duty when it requested a second screening
which disclosed a possible alternative basis for the alcohol content. 185
Reeves argued that the legal duty was owed to him only as a job applicant
and not as an employee-at-will.' 86 The jury rendered a verdict for Reeves,
but the trial court granted WCNA's motion for judgment n.o.v. and entered
judgment for WCNA, and the court of appeals affirmed.187
The court addressed the threshold issue of whether WCNA owed a legal
duty to Reeves. 188 Initially, the court observed that Reeves conceded "that
no cause of action has been recognized in Texas imposing a legal duty on a
prospective employer to report drug and alcohol screening tests results to a
job applicant."' 189 The court observed that there was no evidence that
WCNA conducted the screening tests which resulted in the positive alcohol
results. 190 The court noted that the negligence, if any, in conducting the
screening test would be that of the laboratory, but Reeves did not challenge
the testing procedures of the lab that evaluated his test. ' 9' The court stated
that WCNA, a prospective employer, owed no duty to Reeves to report to
him the results of the drug and alcohol screening test. 192 The court also held
that WCNA owed no duty to report to Reeves the results of the second
screening test. 193 The court concluded that "recovery for negligence is pre-
cluded by the legal principle that no duty is owed by a prospective employer
to a job applicant to disclose results of screening tests for drug or alcohol, i.e.
no cause of action arises."' 194
6. Defamation and Employment Decisions
Defamation under Texas law is "a defamatory statement orally communi-
cated or published to a third person without legal excuse." 95 Under Texas
183. Id. at 390.
184. Id. at 390.
185. Id.
186. Id. 390-91.
187. Id. at 391-92.
188. Id. at 389 (citing Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.
1990)).
189. Id. at 390.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 391.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Texas
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law, the court must make the threshold determination of whether the com-
plained of statement or publication is capable of conveying a defamatory
meaning.' 96 In making this determination, the court construes the state-
ment as a whole, in light of the surrounding circumstances, considering how
a person of ordinary intelligence would understand the statement.1 97 Only
when the court determines the language is ambiguous or of doubtful import
should a jury determine the statement's meaning and the effect of the state-
ment on an ordinary reader.' 98 The courts have also held that a former
employer's refusal to discuss with a prospective employer the reasons or cir-
cumstances surrounding an employee's termination does not constitute
defamation. 199
law) (quoting Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no
writ)). Libel is defined in TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 1986), as a
statement
that tends to blacken the memory of the dead or that tends to injure a living
person's reputation and thereby expose the person to public hatred, contempt or
ridicule, or financial injury or to impeach any person's honesty, integrity, virtue,
or reputation or to publish the natural defects of anyone and thereby expose the
person to public hatred, ridicule, or financial injury.
Id.
196. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989) (citing Musser v. Smith Protective
Serv., Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653, 654-55 (Tex. 1987)); Baubles & Beads v. Louis Vuitton, S.A., 766
S.W.2d 377, 381 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
197. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 570; Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655; Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Pub-
lishing Co., 149 Tex. 87, 96, 228 S.W.2d 499, 504 (1950). See Crum, 946 F.2d at 429 (an-
nouncement to staff that employee on leave pending results of an investigation by an industrial
psychologist/management consultant, whose job was to examine the organization at the air-
line's magazine, cannot be construed as an allegation of mental disturbance).
198. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 570; Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655; Denton Publishing Co. v. Boyd,
460 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. 1970). Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612, 618-19 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1009 (1985) (illus-
trating how a statement that may not appear defamatory may be construed as defamatory by a
jury). In Buck, a prospective new employer of Buck telephoned Hall & Co. to learn about the
circumstances surrounding Buck's termination. One of Hall & Co.'s employees stated that
Buck hadn't reached his production goals. When pressed for more information, the employee
declined to comment. The prospective employer then asked if the company would rehire
Buck, and the employee answered no. The prospective employer testified that because of the
company's employee's comments, he was unwilling to extend an offer of employment. Buck
sued his former employer for defamation of character alleging that Hall & Co. employees
made defamatory statements about him during the course of telephone conversations with
Buck's prospective employers. The jury found in favor of Buck. The company appealed the
jury determination that the alleged statements were defamatory and argued that the words
were susceptible to a nondefamatory interpretation because Buck was never explicitly accused
of any wrongdoing nor was he called anything disparaging. The court disagreed and con-
cluded that there was evidence sufficient to show that the prospective employer understood the
statements made by the defendant's employee in a defamatory sense. Because the statements
were ambiguous, the court held that the jury was entitled to find that the company's state-
ments were calculated to convey that Buck had been terminated because of serious miscon-
duct. Id. at 619.
199. Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., No. 01-92-00134-CV, 1993 WL 414700
(Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.], Oct. 14, 1993, motion for rehearing pending) (former super-
visors held not to have a duty to talk to prospective employer); American Medical Int'l, Inc. v.
Giurintano, 821 S.W.2d 331, 337 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (former
employer has no duty to talk to anyone about a former employee); see Geise v. The Neiman
Marcus Group, Inc., No. H-92-2703, slip op. at 5-6 (S.D. Tex., Apr. 5, 1993) (an employer's
gag order imposed on employees to prevent discussing reasons for another employee's termina-
tion is not defamatory).
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In Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. 200 Robert Bernard sued his
employer for defamation after he was terminated from his position as senior
litigation counsel for Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. (BFI). Bernard al-
leged that the comments of his employer contained within a confidential
memorandum falsely stated that his job skills were inferior. Specifically,
Bernard's supervisor (1) questioned Bernard's judgment in handling the em-
ployment of an attorney to represent BFI on some overweight truck tickets;
(2) asserted that he missed limitation periods (failure to timely answer a law-
suit); and (3) described Bernard's abusive behavior toward BFI staff. Ber-
nard also complained that BFI's failure to discuss Bernard's discharge with
a prospective employer constituted slander. The trial court granted the de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment and Bernard appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed. 20' First, the court held that publication is
an essential element of defamation and that Bernard's petition was devoid of
any allegation of publication. 20 2 Second, with respect to Bernard's supervi-
sor's refusal to "get into" why Bernard was discharged in response to a tele-
phone inquiry from Conoco, a prospective employer, the court held that the
supervisor had no duty to talk to anyone from Conoco about Bernard. 20 3
In Reeves v. Western Co. of North America 2o James Reeves consented to
a drug and alcohol screening test. The results showed indicated a presence
of alcohol of .04%. Upon obtaining the results, Tommy Kuhn, operations
supervisor, was alleged responsible for slander as the result of three conver-
sations. The jury found for Reeves, but the trial court granted WCNA's
motion for judgment n.o.v. The court of appeals affirmed. In the first con-
versation, Kuhn informed Reeves in his office that he had failed the alcohol
test. No one was else was present. The court held that the statement was
true, therefore, it was not slanderous.20 5 The second conversation was with
Reeves' wife in her car as a result of James Reeves' request. Kuhn related to
Reeves' wife that he had failed the alcohol test and that there was nothing he
could do about it personally. The court held that the communication to
Reeves' wife at Reeves' request was not slander because the communication
was privileged 20 6 and because the Reeves invited the communication. 20 7
Kuhn's third conversation occurred when a friend of Reeves telephoned for
information after talking with Reeves. Kuhn told the friend that he "really
couldn't talk about it." Because Reeves' friend agreed that no one at
WCNA made any defamatory or derogatory statements about Reeves, the
200. No. 01-92-00134-CV, 1993 WL 414700 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 14,
1993, motion for rehearing pending).
201. Id. at *2.
202. Id. at *6.
203. Id. (citing Musser v. Smith Protective Servs., Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653, 654 (Tex. 1987);
American Medical Int'l, Inc. v Giurinatano, 821 S.W.2d 331, 337 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1991, no writ)).
204. 867 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ requested).
205. Id. at 393.
206. Id. at 393-94.




court held that there was no slander.20 8
In Marshall Field Stores, Inc. v. Gardiner2° 9 Gary Gardiner was termi-
nated from his sales job with Marshall Field's because of Gardiner's failure
to account for a missing $100 bill to management's satisfaction. In Gar-
diner's view, the discharge branded him as a thief. After unsuccessfully at-
tempting to vindicate himself, Gardiner sued. Gardiner alleged that his
former employer defamed him by communicating unspecified defamatory
statements regarding Gardiner to other unnamed employees of Marshall
Filed's who did not have a qualified privilege to make or receive such a pub-
lication about Gardiner. Upon finding that Marshall Field's ratified the ma-
licious publications, the jury awarded him over $1,000,000 in actual and
punitive damages. Marshall Field's appealed and challenged the legal and
factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.
The court of appeals reviewed the evidence and concluded that there was
no direct evidence that any of the defendants communicated any defamatory
publications to any employee of Marshall Field's. 210 Next, the court consid-
ered whether Gardiner brought forward circumstantial evidence supporting
his claim.21' The court explained, however, that for circumstantial evidence
to support a judgment on appeal, the evidence must lead to the conclusion
"that the existence of the fact is more reasonable than its nonexistence. ' 212
The court then reviewed the circumstantial evidence of the case, including
evidence that the plaintiff did not publish the defamatory statements to any
Marshall Field employees but many employees knew that Gardiner was ac-
cused of stealing $100 from the store.213 The court, however, determined
that the circumstantial evidence could lead to two conclusions: one, that the
defendants published the information to the employees, or two, that the em-
ployees learned the information from gossip resulting from the events sur-
rounding the termination, including the interrogation of the plaintiff by store
security and the immediate termination of Gardiner. 21 4 Because both con-
clusions were equally likely, the court held that the circumstantial evidence
did not support the jury's verdict. 215 Because there was legally insufficient
evidence to support the jury's verdict, the court reversed the judgment and
rendered judgment for the defendants. 216
In McKethan v. Texas Farm Bureau 217 Fred McKethan, an insurance or-
ganization district sales manager, brought suit for slander against his em-
ployer for "cutting comments" made by the presenter at an awards
ceremony. At the awards ceremony, approximately 700 people were in at-
tendance. When it was McKethan's turn for recognition, the presenter told
208. Id.
209. 859 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
210. Id. at 397.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 399.
214. Id. at 400.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 996 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1993).
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McKethan to stand up, but then said, "[s]it down, you don't have anything,
you haven't done anything to be recognized for;"218 that he "never had a
master agent and never would have one."'219 On reconsideration, the district
court granted sua sponte the company's motion for summary judgment.
McKethan appealed, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court observed
that a statement is defamatory "if the words tend to injure a person's reputa-
tion, exposing the person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or financial
injury."' 220 However, the court noted that "the allegedly slanderous state-
ments must be construed as a whole, in light of the surrounding circum-
stances or context in which a person of ordinary intelligence would
understand the statements. '221 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district
court that even if the statements were made, the statements taken in the
undisputed context were not slanderous. 222 The evidence showed that there
had been teasing and laughter at the conventions, and that in the context of a
jovial recognition ceremony, and because of the nature of the remarks, and
McKethan's prominence as an exceptional district sales manager, a person
of ordinary intelligence would not attribute a defamatory meaning to the
remarks.
a. The Doctrine of Self-Publication
Generally, in the employment context, publication of defamation occurs
when an employer communicates to a third party a defamatory statement
about a former employee. The doctrine of self-publication provides that
publication also occurs when an individual is compelled to publish defama-
tory statements in response to inquiries of prospective employers, and the
former employer should have foreseen that compulsion. 223 Unlike other ju-
risdictions, Texas does not analyze the circumstances in terms of whether
the facts compelled the former employee to repeat the defamatory words;224
focusing instead on the foreseeability that the words be communicated to a
218. Id. at 736.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 743 (quoting Einhorn v. LaChance, 823 S.W.2d 405, 410-11 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [list Dist.] 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.)).
221. Id. (quoting Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Tucker, 806 S.W.2d 914, 920-21 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.)).
222. Id.
223. See Diane H. Mazur, Note, Self-Publication of Defamation and Employee Discharge, 6
REV. LITIG. 313, 314 (1987). Two cases in Texas recognize the doctrine of self-publication.
See Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439, 445 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (court held it was reasonable to expect that contractor dismissed from a project for
theft would be required to repeat reason to others); First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696,
701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court held it was reasonable to
expect that former bank employee discharged for dishonesty would be required to admit in
employment interview or in application for employment about same). See also Reeves v. West-
em Co. of N. Am., 867 S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ requested)
(observing that the self-defamation doctrine has not been recognized by all the Texas courts).
224. See McKinney v. Santa Clara County, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980);
Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1343 (Colo. 1988); Belcher v. Little, 315
N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa 1982); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 895
(Minn. 1986) (the following must be proven for a finding that a statement is self-compelled:




Recently, in Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. ,226 the Quaker Oats Com-
pany (Quaker Oats) offered Jane Doe a job as a marketing assistant condi-
tioned upon Doe satisfactorily passing a drug-screening examination (to
which Doe consented). The only medication Doe listed on the questionnaire
was her prescribed birth control pills. After taking the drug test,
SmithKline Beecham Corporation (SmithKline) forwarded the results to
Quaker Oats. The results showed that Doe's sample tested positive for the
presence of opiates. Quaker Oats then rescinded Doe's offer of employment.
Doe offered as an explanation that she had taken one of her roommate's
prescription painkillers - an explanation she later recanted.227 Doe then
asserted that the reason for the positive drug test was the result of her con-
sumption of several poppy seed muffins in the days before her drug test. It
was undisputed that scientific literature on drug testing reported that ordi-
nary poppy seed consumption could produce positive test results for opiates.
Doe reapplied for the job, but was turned down for misrepresenting that she
had taken someone else's prescription medication. Among other things, Doe
sued Quaker Oats and SmithKline for defamation alleging that she was com-
pelled to disclose her failure of the drug test to other prospective employers.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and
Doe appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed. The court observed that the Texas
Supreme Court has not adopted the doctrine of self-defamation. 228 The
court held that the rule remains that "if the publication of which the plaintiff
complains was consented to, authorized, invited or procured by the plaintiff,
he cannot recover for injuries sustained by reason of the publication. '229
The court rejected Doe's reliance on Chasewood Construction Co. v. Rico 230
and First State Bank v. Ake 23 1 which rely on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 577 comment m:
existence of the strong compulsion was reasonably foreseeable to the wrongdoer; and (3) such
disclosure was actually made).
225. Chasewood, 696 S.W.2d at 445-46; Ake, 606 S.W.2d at 701. The Texas courts' recog-
nition of the doctrine of self-publication is based upon comment k of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977). Comment k provides:
k. Intentional or negligent publication. There is an intent to publish defama-
tory matter when the actor does an act for the purpose of communicating it to a
third person or with knowledge that it is substantially certain to be so communi-
cated ....
It is not necessary, however, that the communication to a third person be
intentional. If a reasonable person would recognize that an act creates an unrea-
sonable risk that the defamatory matter will be communicated to a third person,
the conduct becomes a negligent communication. A negligent communication
amounts to a publication just as effectively as an intentional communication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. k (1977).
226. 855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ granted).
227. Id. at 251. Doe accounted for the lie regarding the painkillers as made " 'under ex-
treme duress' and when she was 'completely, essentially out of [her] mind.' " Id.
228. Id. at 259.
229. Id. (quoting Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 94, 188 S.W.2d 770, 772 (1945)).
230. 696 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
231. 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
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One who communicates defamatory matter directly to the defamed per-
son, who himself communicates it to a third party, has not published
the matter to third party if there are no other circumstances. If the
defamed person's transmission of the communication to the third person
was made, however, without an awareness of the defamatory nature of
the matter and if the circumstances indicated that communication to a
third party is likely, however, a publication may properly be held to
have occurred. 232
The court noted that the Chasewood and Ake opinions omit the emphasized
portion of the RESTATEMENT which is essential because "it constitutes the
first hurdle of a two-part test for self-defamation: (1) the defamed person was
unaware of the defamatory nature of the matter; and (2) the circumstances
indicated that the communication to the third party would be likely. '233
The court observed that Doe immediately knew of the defamatory implica-
tions of the statement; therefore, the court held that Doe failed to satisfy the
first part of the two-part test.234 Furthermore, the court reasoned that Doe
did not meet the first requirement of a self-defamation claim, that the de-
famed person was unaware of the defamatory nature of the matter. 235
In a drug-screening test case, Reeves v. Western Co. of North America,236
James Reeves consented to a drug and alcohol screening test. The results
showed indicated a presence of alcohol of .04%, therefore, Reeves was not
hired. Reeves sued for slander caused by self-defamation. The jury found
for Reeves, but the trial court granted the company's motion for judgment
n.o.v. The court of appeals affirmed. The court first observed that no pro-
spective employer testified that it rejected Reeves because he was compelled
to publish a defamatory statement about himself.237 The court found that
Reeves's testimony about the "grapevine" in the oil field business, and about
unnamed people who knew of the test and presumed Reeves to be an alco-
holic, and about "word getting around" was not sufficient in the absence of
identifying any people or testimony from these people. 238 Accordingly, the
court held that Reeves's speculation about possible consequences if prospec-
tive employers learned that Reeves failed the alcohol test would not support
his claim. 239
In Purcell v. Seguin State Bank and Trust Co.,240 Walter Purcell, a trust
department manager of the bank, was discharged because of his poor man-
agement techniques and technical deficiencies. Purcell brought suit for self-
compelled defamation. The district court granted the bank's motion for
summary judgment and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Purcell argued that the
232. Doe, 855 S.W.2d at 259 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. m
(1977) (emphasis added)).
233. Id. (quoting Chasewood, 696 S.W.2d at 449).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. 867 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ requested).
237. Id. at 395.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. 999 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1993).
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bank gave him false reasons for his discharge and by doing so created a
foreseeable and unreasonable risk that he would be compelled to repeat the
reasons to prospective employers. The court observed that Texas courts rec-
ognize the narrow exception of self-compelled defamation.2 4 ' The court
stated, though, that the bank enjoys a qualified privilege that could only be
overcome if Purcell proved that the bank acted with malice.242 Because
there was no evidence that the bank acted with malice, the court affirmed the
summary judgment.
b. Absolute Privilege
Any communication, oral or written, which is uttered or published in the
course of or in contemplation of a judicial proceeding is absolutely privi-
leged. 243 No action for damages will lie for such communication even
though it is false and published with malice. 244 The privilege has also been
extended to proceedings before executive officers, boards, and commissions
exercising quasi-judicial powers. 245 Examples of quasi-judicial bodies in-
clude the State Bar Grievance Committee, a grand jury, the Railroad Com-
mission, the Pharmacy Board, the Internal Affairs Division of the Police
Department of Dallas,246 and the Texas Employment Commission. 247
A communication by an employer about a former employee may also be
absolutely privileged if the employee authorized the communication. 248
When a plaintiff consents to a publication, the defendant is absolutely privi-
leged to make it even if it proves to be defamatory. 249 Texas follows the
general rule that if a plaintiff complains about a publication which he con-
sented to, authorized, invited or procured, the plaintiff cannot recover for
injuries sustained as a result of the publication.250 In other words, the con-
sent privilege applies when a plaintiff gives references for a prospective em-
ployer to contact and the former employer makes defamatory statements. 251
While there is some uncertainty whether consent creates an absolute privi-
lege or simply makes the defamation not actionable, the distinction is irrele-
241. Id. at 959 (citing Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1985, writ refd n.r.e.); First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
242. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 755 cmt. n (1977)).
243. James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916-17 (Tex. 1982).
244. Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 105, 109, 166 S.W.2d 909, 912 (1942).
245. Id. at 912.
246. Putter v. Anderson, 601 S.W.2d 73, 77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref d
n.r.e.).
247. Taylor v. Houston Lighting and Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 303 (S.D. Tex. 1990);
Krenek v. Abel, 594 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
248. Smith v. Holley, 827 S.W.2d 433, 436 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
249. Id. at 436 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977)).
250. Id. at 437 (citing Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 188 S.W.2d 770, 772 (1945)). See Jones
v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist,, 979 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Texas law the
court held that plaintiff waived state law libel claim based on a defendant's publication of a
memorandum to the school district where plaintiff released the defendants from liability for
information they provided to the district).
251. Id. (citing 2 F. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.17 at 138-39 (2d ed. 1986)).
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vant because the result is the same. 252
In Brooks v. Scherler2 53 Paul Scherler sued several of his fellow employees
contending that their accusations of sexual harassment against him consti-
tuted actionable defamation. The defendants countered that their accusa-
tions were true, and, thus, not defamatory. In the alternative, the defendants
argued that their statements were protected under governmental immunity
(as city employees). The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the
trial court denied their motion for summary judgment. The defendants ap-
pealed the denial of their claim of governmental immunity. 254
The court of appeals reversed and stated that a government official or
employee who is sued in an individual capacity may invoke governmental
immunity if the official or employee's status or action was quasi-judicial, the
official or employee acted in good faith, and the employee acted within the
scope of his or her authority. 255 The court then noted that a government
employee's actions are quasi-judicial if they are discretionary, rather than
ministerial. 256 Discretionary actions require thought and deliberation, while
ministerial actions require merely obedience to directives. 257 The court rea-
soned that the defendants were undeniably employees of a government, as
employees of the city of Houston. 258 Also, the employees were directed to
comply with a sexual harassment policy recently instituted by the city, a
program that was premised on the employees' discretionary authority to re-
port incidences of sexual harassment. 259 Consequently, the court held that
the defendants' actions of reporting the harassment were discretionary acts
and of a quasi-judicial nature.260 The court also concluded that this report-
ing was conducted in the course and scope of the defendants'
employment.261
Next, the court addressed the issue of whether the defendants acted with
good faith when they reported the plaintiff for sexual harassment. 262 The
court reviewed the evidence presented at the hearing to consider the motion
for summary judgment and found that two governmental entities had con-
cluded that the defendants' claims were true.263 With all three elements of
252. Id. at 437-38. The court noted that the RESTATEMENT and other treatises conclude
that consent creates an absolute privilege. Id. at 437 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 583; PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 114; F. HARPERET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 5.17). The Texas cases seem to suggest that consent simply makes the defamation not ac-
tionable. Id. at 438 (citing Lyle, 188 S.W.2d at 772; Duncantell v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 446
S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mayfield v.
Gleichert, 437 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, no writ); Wilks v. DeBolt, 211
S.W.2d 589, 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1948, no writ)).
253. 859 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).












governmental immunity established, the court held that no genuine issue of
material fact existed to preclude granting the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment; therefore, the court reversed the trial court's denial of the
defendants' motion. 264
c. An Employer's Qualified Privilege
An employer will not be liable if the statement is published under circum-
stances that make it conditionally privileged and if the privilege is not
abused.265 "Whether a qualified privilege exists is a question of law."' 266 "A
qualified privilege comprehends communication made in good faith on sub-
ject matter in which the author has an interest or with reference to which he
has an interest or with reference to which he has a duty to perform to an-
other person having a corresponding interest or duty. ' 267 Generally, defam-
atory statements by an employer about an employee, or former employee, to
a person having a common interest in the matter to which the communica-
tion relates, such as a prospective employer, are qualifiedly privileged. 268
An employer may lose the qualified privilege if his communication or pub-
lication is accompanied by actual malice. 269 In defamation cases, actual
malice is separate and distinct from traditional common law malice.270 Ac-
tual malice does not include ill will, spite or evil motive; rather, it requires
"the making of a statement with knowledge that it is false, or with reckless
disregard of whether it is true. ' 27 1 Further, " '[r]eckless disregard' is de-
fined as a high degree of awareness of probable falsity, for proof of which the
264. Id.
265. Danawala v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 4 F.3d 989, slip op. at 2673 (5th Cir.
1993) (not for publication); Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 806 (5th Cir. 1990); Gaines v.
CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 681 F.2d 982, 986 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Bergman v. Oshman's Sport-
ing Goods, Inc., 594 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ); Butler v. Central
Bank & Trust Co., 458 S.W.2d 510, 514-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ dism'd w.o.j.));
Houston v. Grocers Supply Co., 625 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981,
no writ); Duncantell v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 446 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1969, writ refd n.r.e.).
266. Boze, 912 F.2d at 806 (interpreting Texas law); Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800
(citing Oshman's Sporting Goods, 594 S.W.2d at 816; Mayfield v. Gleichart, 484 S.W.2d 619,
626 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, no writ)).
267. Boze, 912 F.2d at 806 (quoting Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800); see Smith v. Hol-
ley, 827 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied); Duncantell, 446 S.W.2d at
937; 2 F. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.26 at 228 (2d ed. 1986)).
268. Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ)
(citing Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800; Oshman's Sporting Goods, 594 S.W.2d at 816);
Duncantell, 446 S.W.2d at 937.
269. Dixon v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 607 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. 1980); Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. O'Neil, 456 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex. 1970); Marathon Oil Co. v. Salazar, 682
S.W.2d 624, 630-31 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Grocers Supply,
625 S.W.2d at 801; Bridges v. Farmer, 483 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no
writ). See Danawala v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 4 F.3d 989, slip op. 2673 (5th Cir.
1993) (not for publication) (unauthorized gossip spread by unidentified co-workers does not
take the defendants outside the scope of the qualified privilege).
270. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tex. 1989); Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567,
571 (Tex. 1989).
271. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 571 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 328
(1974)).
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plaintiff must present 'sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publica-
tion.' "272 An error in judgment is not sufficient to show actual malice.273
While the Texas cases adopting the doctrine of self-publication do not ad-
dress the issue of whether a qualified privilege exists in self-defamation ac-
tions, 274 decisions in other jurisdictions which recognize the doctrine of self-
publication have recognized a qualified privilege in the employment con-
text. 275 A federal district court in Texas has recognized that such a privilege
may exist in self-defamation actions; however, the court rendered judgment
on other grounds.276
In Johnson v. Randall's Food Markets 277 Mary Lynn Johnson was termi-
nated from Randall's after she allegedly stole a Christmas wreath from her
employer. Johnson sued Randall's claiming slander. Johnson's supervisors
allegedly communicated this information to other Randall's employees.
Randall's presented evidence that showed that they considered Johnson's
motive for removing the wreath an open question. Johnson, however,
presented evidence that Randall's personnel believed that she had stolen the
wreath and were publishing the incident as a theft. The trial court granted
summary judgment for Randall's and Johnson appealed. The court first ob-
served that a false accusation of theft constitutes slander2 78 Because Ran-
dall's did not offer evidence that the statement was true, but only that it had
not determined the truth or falsity of the accusation, the court determined
that there was a fact issue as to whether the employer made the statement in
question, and whether the statement was false, and therefore, slanderous.
279
Randall's also argued that even if the statement was slanderous, it was pro-
tected by a conditional privilege. While the court acknowledged that this
privilege would protect the communication, the court pointed out that the
272. Id. (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Casso, 776 S.W.2d at
558).
273. Id.
274. See supra notes 223-42.
275. See, e.g., Steinbach v. Northwestern Nat'i Life Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 1389, 1396 (D.
Minn. 1989) (Minnesota law recognizes a qualified privilege in the employer/employee rela-
tionship if the statements were made in good faith); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d
1336, 1347 (Colo. 1988) (qualified privilege recognized in the employer-employee context);
Elmore v. Shell Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 544, 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (recognizing existence of a
qualified privilege); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
In Lewis, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly acknowledged the reason for allowing the
qualified privilege in self-publication cases:
Where an employer would be entitled to a privilege if it had actually published
the statement, it makes little sense to deny the privilege where the identical com-
munication is made to identical third parties with the only difference being the
mode of publication. Finally, recognition of a qualified privilege seems to be the
only effective means of addressing the concern that every time an employer
states the reason for discharging an employee it will subject itself to potential
liability for defamation.
Id. at 889-90.
276. Young v. Dow Chem. Co., No. H-90-1145, 1991 WL 138322, at *3 (S.D. Tex., Apr. 5,
1991).
277. 869 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ requested).




privilege is lost if a defendant makes statements with malice. 280 Because
Randall's did not present evidence to establish the absence of malice as a
matter of law, summary judgment on the claim was improper. 28 '
In Pioneer Concrete, Inc. v. Allen 282 Troy Allen contended that his former
employer defamed him when the former employer made false statements
when answering questions posed by an individual from a "head-hunting"
firm (J. T. McCullough) who called to obtain a reference concerning Allen.
The evidence reflected that Allen gave McCullough permission to check out
Allen's references. McCullough contacted Allen's former employer (Pio-
neer) and Pioneer made statements to McCullough that were defamatory in
response to questions about Allen's capabilities. Upon a jury trial, the jury
awarded more than $140,000 to Allen for defamation. Pioneer appealed,
and the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for Pioneer. 28 3
On appeal Pioneer argued that it possessed a qualified privilege that pre-
cluded Allen's defamation claim as a matter of law. Noting that a qualified
privilege protects communications made in good faith regarding a topic in
which the speaker and other person share a common interest. The court
noted that the defendant has the burden to prove a qualified privilege and
that the statements were not made with malice. 284 The court also deter-
mined that the evidence showed that Pioneer and McCullough shared a
common interest. 28 5 The court observed that a conditional privilege exists
"whenever a public or private interest in the availability of correct informa-
tion is of sufficient importance to require protection of honest communica-
tion of misinformation. ' 286 Because McCullough called to obtain
information concerning Allen's work habits and skills, these issues were of
common interest to both Pioneer and the head-hunting firm.287 The court
reasoned that although Pioneer had no duty to volunteer information con-
cerning Allen to the head-hunting firm, Pioneer was required to present
what it thought to be correct information. 288 Accordingly, the court held
that Pioneer was protected by the qualified privilege and set aside the jury's
verdict. 28 9
In Martin v. Southwestern Electric Power Co. 290 Mike Martin was injured
when he came in contact with high voltage lines. The president of South-
280. Id. "A report of wrongdoing establishes a defendant's conditional privilege to make
inquiries or investigations." Id. at 395 (citing Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Dixon, 575
S.W.2d 596, 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978), writ dism'd w.o.j., 607 S.W.2d 240
(Tex. 1980)).
281. Id. at 395.
282. 858 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
283. Id. at 51.
284. Id. at 49 (citing Denton Publishing Co. v. Boyd, 460 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. 1970)).
285. Id. at 50.
286. Id. (quoting Kaplan v. Goodfried, 497 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1973, no writ)).
287. Id. at 50.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 51. The jury found that Pioneer did not act with malice and that finding was
not challenged on appeal. Id.
290. 860 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied).
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western Electric Power Company (SEPC) distributed a letter to its foremen
and supervisors referring to Martin's accident and alleging that Martin had a
long history of neglecting safety procedures, failing to follow instructions,
and lack of interest in his work and the safety book. Martin sued SEPC for
defamation. The trial court granted summary judgment to SEPC, and a di-
vided court of appeals affirmed. 29 1 The court held that the statements in the
letter were protected by a qualified privilege for communications made in
good faith on a subject in which the author has an interest or duty to another
person having a corresponding interest or duty.292 The court observed that
the statements could only be defamatory if they were made with actual mal-
ice. 293 A majority of the court held that the summary judgment evidence
negated the issue of malice as a matter of law. 294 The court noted that the
affidavit of SEPC's president stated that he did not have any ill will or malice
toward Martin, that he believed the information to be true based upon the
investigation and report of Martin's accident and on word-of-mouth infor-
mation he received in discussing the accident, and that he relied upon the
truth of the statements in the report and information given to him. The
majority concluded that such reliance under the circumstances and the affi-
davit negated malice unless controverted. 295 The court concluded that Mar-
tin's affidavit in which he stated that "I know that most of the assertions
made in the letter about me are not true and, therefore: the letter must have
been written based on malice directed at me,"' 296 was merely a conclusion
and did not create a fact issue.297
In Schauer v. Memorial Care Systems 2 98 Helen Schauer sued her em-
ployer after she was denied a supervisory position and was given only a
"fair" rating in an employment performance appraisal. Schauer asserted
several claims, including that the statements contained within the perform-
ance appraisal were libelous. Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that her su-
pervisor's comments indicating that the plaintiff had (1) not followed proper
nursing policies and procedures and had not been effective in her job, (2)
only reluctantly performed certain required tasks, (3) failed to be sensitive to
employee relations, (4) needed to improve on her ability to anticipate work-
related problems, (5) worked excessive overtime, and (6) improperly handled
narcotics wastage. 299 The trial court granted summary to the defendants
concluding that the statements were not libelous, and Schauer appealed.
291. Id. at 200.
292. Id. at 199.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 200.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. Justice Bleil dissented and argued that the letter, which attacked Martin's hon-
esty, integrity, and reputation, was probably distributed to all of the company's employees. He
also noted that certain of the remarks in the letter were not supported by the investigative
report. Further, the letter included only negative information about Martin, and no positive
information. From this evidence, Justice Bleil concluded that a jury could infer malice,
thereby creating a fact issue. Id. at 200-01.




On appeal Memorial argued that the evaluation was not defamatory as a
matter of law because the statements are truthful, permissible expressions of
opinion or, alternatively, not capable of a defamatory meaning. The court
agreed and found that none of the statements were untrue; and that even if
untrue, were opinions and protected by the First Amendment free speech
guarantees. 3° ° The court also considered Schauer's argument that if any of
the statements were libelous, they were made with malice, and, conse-
quently, fall outside any qualified privilege. The court disagreed with
Schauer's contention, holding that the law presumes that statements cloaked
with a qualified privilege are made in good faith and without malice.30 1 The
court further noted that Schauer must present clear, positive, and direct evi-
dence of malice if, in support of its motion for summary judgment, the de-
fendant provides an affidavit asserting an absence of malice. 30 2 Because
Schauer did not meet her burden, the summary judgment on the issue of a
qualified privilege was affirmed. 30
3
7. Invasion of Privacy
In 1973, the Texas Supreme Court recognized the right of privacy 30 4 by
stating that "an unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy constitutes a
legal injury for which a remedy will be granted. ' 30 5 Subsequently, the
supreme court recognized four categories of invasion of privacy identified by
Dean Prosser: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2)
appropriation of another's name or likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity given
to another's private life; and (4) publicity that unreasonably places another
in a false light before the public.30 6 In Diamond Shamrock Refining and
Marketing Co. v. Mendez 30 7 the Texas Supreme Court left open the question
whether it would recognize the fourth category of invasion of privacy: the
300. Id. at 447.
301. Id. at 447-48.
302. Id. at 450.
303. Id.
304. In 1973, the Texas Supreme Court recognized the right of privacy in Billings v. Atkin-
son, 484 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973). In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis pro-
pounded a concept of a right of privacy which they asserted justified an independent tort
remedy. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193,
193-98 (1890) [hereinafter Warren & Brandeis]. The Warren and Brandeis article resulted
from a Boston newspaper's regular practice of elaborating on the Warrens' social life. Bruce
A. McKenna, Comment, False Light: Invasion of Privacy?, 15 TULSA L.J. 113, 114 (1979). As
McKenna observed, Warren's concern with the publication of this gossip and his discussions
with Brandeis led to the birth of the law of privacy. The overriding concern of the Warren and
Brandeis article was how to deal with excesses by the press. Warren & Brandeis at 195-96.
305. Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex. 1973).
306. Industrial Found. of the South v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 682
(Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977) (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 383, 389 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser]; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117
at 809 (4th ed. 1971)). Interestingly, Dean Prosser was skeptical about the desirability of the
false light privacy action because of its potential confusion with defamation. See WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 at 813-14; Prosser, supra at 400-01. Nevertheless, Pros-
ser's analysis of the four categories of invasion of privacy was subsequently adopted by the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (1977).
307. 844 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1992).
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false light theory of invasion of privacy. 30 Recently, though, the Fifth Cir-
cuit certified the question to the Texas Supreme Court,309 and the Texas
Supreme Court agreed to answer the questions certified. 310
In Farrington v. Sysco Food Services, Inc.311 Willie Farrington sued his
former employer for invasion of privacy arising out of the company's re-
quirement that he take a drug and polygraph test after the company found
Farrington's business card holder with a substance that looked like cocaine
contained in it. The trial court granted the employer's summary judgment
and the court of appeals affirmed. 312 The court held that while Texas recog-
nizes the common law right to privacy, 313 the Texas courts have held that
drug testing and polygraph examinations do not constitute an invasion of
privacy where there is consent. 314 Because Farrington consented to the
tests, his consent negated any claim of invasion of privacy. 315
In Reeves v. Western Co. of North America 316 James Reeves sued Western
Company of North America (WCNA) for invasion of privacy by publicly
placing him in a false light as the result of his failure to pass a drug screening
and alcohol pre-employment test. The jury found for Reeves, but the trial
court granted WCNA's motion for judgment n.o.v. The court of appeals
affirmed. The court held that there was no evidence that WCNA published
the results of the drug test "to a significant number of individuals or to the
public at large. '"317 The court also held that the privilege defense and con-
sent, equally applicable to a false light claim, barred his claim. 318
308. Id. at 200. The RESTATEMENT provides the following definition of publicity placing
[a] person in a false light:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977); see also Rodney A. Smolla, LAW OF DEF-
AMATION § 10.0211] at 10-7 (1989). The Texas courts of appeals have followed the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS when reviewing the false light theory of invasion of privacy.
Clarke v. Denton Publishing Co., 793 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ
denied); Covington v. Houston Post, 743 S.W.2d 345, 346-47 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, no writ); Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222, 223-24 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no
writ); see Moore v. Big Picture Co., 828 F.2d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 1987) (interpreting Texas law).
309. Cain v. Hearst Corp., I F.3d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1993).
310. Cain v. Hearst Corp., 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 513 (Feb. 9, 1994).
311. 865 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston (ist Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
312. Id. at 254.
313. Id. at 253 (citing Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex. 1973)).
314. Id. (citing Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1989, writ denied); Texas Employment Comm'n v. Hughes Drilling Fluids,
Inc., 746 S.W.2d 796, 801-02 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, writ denied)).
315. Id. at 254.
316. 867 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ requested).
317. Id. at 396 (citing Moore v. Big Picture Co., 828 F.2d 270, 273-74 (5th Cir. 1987)).
318. Id. at 396 (citing Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1107 (1985)).
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& Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Although individuals continue to urge the courts to adopt an implied con-
tractual covenant or a tortious duty of good faith and fair dealing in the
employer-employee relationship, the Texas Supreme Court3 19 and the courts
of appeals 320 have refused to recognize such an obligation. It appears that
319. See Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 284 n.l (Tex. 1993) (per
curiam) (noting that supreme court has declined to recognize a general duty of good faith and
fair dealing in the employer-employee relationship); McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 807
S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1991), a ffg 757 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988,
writ granted); Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 724 n.2 (Tex.
1990); see also Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 1991) (Texas courts do
not recognize covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship); Caton
v. Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 948-49 (5th Cir. 1990) (Texas courts do not recognize duty of
good faith and fair dealing in employment relationship); Rayburn v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 805 F. Supp. 1401, 1409 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (Texas courts do not recognize either contrac-
tual implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or tort duty of good faith and fair dealing
in employment relationship); Guzman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 756 F. Supp. 994, 1000-01
(W.D. Tex. 1990) (Texas courts do not recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing in em-
ployment relationship); Nicholls v. Columbia Gas Dev. Corp., No. 89-2418 (S.D. Tex. Nov.
14, 1990) (Texas courts do not recognize claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in employment contract); Haynes v. Henry S. Miller Management Corp., No.
CA3-88-2556-T (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1990) (Texas Supreme Court has not recognized implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. 839, 842
(S.D. Tex. 1989) (Texas courts do not recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing in employ-
ment relationship); Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275, 276-77 (W.D. Tex.
1989) (no duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationship).
320. See Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., No. 01-92-0013Y-CV, 1993 WL 414700,
at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 14 1993, n.w.h.) (not designated for publication);
Cole v. Hall, 864 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, n.w.h.) (en banc) (rejecting claim
for duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship); Doe v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d 248, 260 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ granted) (holding that an
employer does not owe a duty of good faith and fair dealing to an employee); Amador v. Tan,
855 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied) (recognizing that supreme court
expressly rejected an invitation to recognize the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in the employment area); Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 71 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied) (no cause of action for breach of duty of good faith and
fair dealing in employment context); Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466, 468-69 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1991), rev'd on other grounds, Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732
(Tex. 1993); (rejecting claim for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, court recognized
that current mood of a majority supreme court is to adhere to at will rule); Winograd v. Willis,
789 S.W.2d 307, 312 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (neither the legisla-
ture nor the supreme court have recognized an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in the employment relationship); Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299, 303-04
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (supreme court expressly rejected an invitation to rec-
ognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship);
Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (court rejected implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
employment relationship).
In Lumpkin the sole point of error on appeal to the court of appeals was whether an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is inherent in the employer-employee relationship.
Lumpkin, 755 S.W.2d at 539. The court of appeals overruled Lumpkin's point of error, and
Lumpkin appealed the issue to the supreme court. Lumkpin v. H & C Communications, Inc.,
32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 13 (Oct. 16, 1988). Lumpkin's application for a writ of error had been
pending before the supreme court for approximately one year when the court decided McClen-
don, infra, note 271. Curiously, the supreme court did not grant Lumpkin's application when
it granted McClendon's application and consolidate the cases. Nevertheless, shortly after Mc-
Clendon, the court denied Lumpkin's application for a writ of error. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 114
(Dec. 6, 1989).
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the Texas Supreme Court laid the issue to rest in McClendon v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co.321 On remand from the United States Supreme Court,322 the
Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision that there is not
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment rela-
tionship. 323 The McClendon court of appeals specifically declined to extend
the Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. 324 duty of good
faith and fair dealing to the employment relationship. 325 It held that the
special relationship between insurers and insureds is not equally applicable
to employers and employees, and that to extend it to the employment rela-
tionship would be tantamount to imposing such a duty on all commercial
relationships. 326 Imposing the duty on the employment relationship would
also violate the supreme court's disapproval of restrictions on free movement
of employees in the workplace. 327 Finally, the plethora of legislation re-
stricting an employer's right to discharge an employee indicates that such a
change in policy affecting the employer-employee relationship should be left
to the legislature. 328
9. False Imprisonment
In Johnson v. Randall's Food Markets 329 Mary Lynn Johnson, a manager
of a Randall's grocery store, left the store without paying for a Christmas
wreath. Two days later, Johnson was interviewed by Mike Seals, the district
manager, and by Lewis Simmons, the store director, concerning the incident.
During the interview, Johnson claimed that she had so much on her mind
that she had forgotten to pay for the wreath. As a result of the incident,
Johnson brought suit against Randall's, Seals, Simmons, and other Randall's
employees alleging, among other things, false imprisonment. In support of
her claim for false imprisonment, Johnson claimed that prior to the inter-
view with Simmons and Seals, Simmons ordered Johnson to wait in a back
room for two to three hours for Seals to arrive. Johnson also testified that
she believed that Simmons would physically try to stop her if she had tried
to leave. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Randall's
and the individual defendants on all claims asserted by Johnson, including
the claim for false imprisonment, and Johnson appealed.
321. 757 S.W.2d 816, 819-20 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), a/['d on remand, 807 S.W.2d
577 (Tex. 1991).
322. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
323. McClendon, 807 S.W.2d at 577.
324. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987) (duty of good faith and fair dealing extended to insurers
and insureds).
325. McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at 819-20.
326. Id. at 819.
327. Id. at 820 (citing Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1987); Hill v.
Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987)).
328. McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at 820 (citing TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1; Molder v. Southwest-
ern Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ refd
n.r.e.)); Watson v. Zep Mfg. Co., 582 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
329. 869 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ requested).
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In reversing the trial court's summary judgment on the false imprison-
ment claim, the court of appeals set forth the following elements of the tort
of false imprisonment: "(1) willful detention of the plaintiff, (2) without the
plaintiff's consent, (3) without authority of law." 330 With respect to the first
element, the court noted that even if Johnson did leave the room on two
occasions, once to go to the bathroom and another to go to another back
room, the detention may have been unlawful in that it prevented Johnson
from returning to her department on the store floor, the direction in which
she wished to go. 331 Furthermore, the court explained that an unlawful de-
tention could be accomplished by words alone, where Johnson employment
may have had a bearing on her submission to the authority of Simmons.3 32
With respect to the second element, the court explained that there was no
argument that Johnson had consented to the detention. 33 3 With respect to
the third element, the court found that Johnson was not detained with au-
thority of law. 334 The court determined that Section 124.001 of the Texas
Civil Practices and Remedies Code, which provides that "[a] person who
reasonably believes that another has stolen or is attempting to steal property
is privileged to detain that person in a reasonable manner and for a reason-
able time to investigate ownership of the property, ' 335 did not apply.3 36 The
court reasoned that because Johnson admitted that she did not pay for the
wreath upon leaving the store, ownership of the property was not an is-
sue. 337 The court also rejected Randall's argument that pursuant to the de-
cision in Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Amburn 338 they were entitled to detain
Johnson to discuss matters bearing upon the employment, particularly
where the employer had information regarding the fidelity of the em-
ployee. 339 Though not disagreeing with the holding in Amburn, the court of
appeals reasoned that Randall's may have been entitled to detain Johnson in
the first place, but was not entitled to detain her through assault. 340 The
court concluded that because of Simmons' threat to Johnson that she "stay
put" may have inspired a just fear of injury in Johnson, there existed a genu-
ine issue of material fact regarding the unlawfulness of Johnson's
detention. 34 1
10. Civil Conspiracy
In Johnson v. Randall's Food Markets 34 2 Mary Lynn Johnson, a manager





335. Id. at 399; TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 124.001 (Vernon 1986).
336. Johnson, 869 S.W.2d at 399.
337. Id.
338. 388 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1965, no writ).
339. Johnson, 869 S.W.2d at 399.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. 869 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.], writ requested).
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of a Randall's grocery store, left the store without paying for a Christmas
wreath. Johnson claimed that she had so much on her mind that she had
forgotten to pay for the wreath. As a result of the incident, Johnson brought
suit against Randall's and several Randall's employees alleging, among other
things, civil conspiracy. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of Randall's and the individual defendants on all claims asserted by Johnson,
including the claim for civil conspiracy, and Johnson appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment on the
civil conspiracy claim. 343 In so doing, the court reasoned that all of John-
son's allegations involved conduct of persons who were either employees or
agents of Randall's at the time the conduct was alleged to have occurred. 344
Thus, because all of the conduct of which Johnson complained occurred
within the course and scope of the employees' and agents' service to Ran-
dall's, the civil conspiracy claim was defeated by the rule that a corporation
cannot conspire with itself.345
In Hennigan v. I.P. Petroleum Co. 346 Lois Hennigan and her husband,
Aldon, were both security guards employed at I.P. Petroleum. In connec-
tion with their divorce, Lois obtained a temporary restraining order that
prevented Aldon from going to Lois' place of employment. The day after
Aldon was served with the temporary restraining order, Lois was termi-
nated. Lois then sued I.P. Petroleum for civil conspiracy and other causes of
action. The district court granted I.P. Petroleum's motion for summary
judgment, and Lois appealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
granting of summary judgment, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case for trial.
In affirming the trial court's judgment regarding Lois' civil conspiracy
claim, the court of appeals explained that in order to establish a claim for
civil conspiracy, Lois was required to show that there was a combination of
two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a
lawful purpose by an unlawful means. 347 Furthermore, the court explained
that to be actionable, a civil conspiracy must consist of wrongs that would be
actionable against the conspirators individually. 348 The court concluded
that because summary judgment had been granted in favor of I.P. Petroleum
on Lois' underlying discrimination and emotional distress claims, summary
judgment was proper as to any claim of an overarching conspiracy. 349
B. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
In Albertson's, Inc. v. Ortiz350 several volunteers for the United Farm
Workers went to an Albertson's store in Austin and stood on the sidewalk
343. Id. at 399-400.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. 848 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Beaumont), rev'd in part, 858 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. 1993).
347. Id. at 279.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 279-80.
350. 856 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
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and parking lot thoroughfare in front of the store to approach customers,
distribute leaflets and solicit signatures on a petition. The store's manager
informed the volunteers of the no-solicitation policy and asked them to leave
and informed them that if they did not leave he would call the police. The
volunteers insisted that they were only exercising their constitutional right of
free speech. After a second warning, the police were called. The volunteers
were arrested, briefly jailed, and released. After being acquitted on criminal
trespass charges, the volunteers sued Albertson's for denial of individual
rights protected under the Texas Constitution. Upon a jury trial, the trial
court rendered a judgment for two of the volunteers against Albertson's for
unreasonably interfering with their freedom of speech and awarded to each
of them $750 in damages. On appeal, Albertson's argued that there is no
cause of action in Texas to support the award of damages against Albert-
son's for infringement of the volunteers' rights of free expression under arti-
cle I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution. 35 ' Because there is no Texas
statutory remedy similar to the federal statute which creates a cause of ac-
tion for interference with a party's federal civil rights, 352 the volunteers
asked the court to infer a comparable compensatory remedy for violations of
state constitutional rights and to eliminate any requirement that the viola-
tion occur under "color of state law" as required by the federal statute. 353
The court first noted the crucial distinction between Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 354 which the volunteers relied upon, and their case. In Biv-
ens, the plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
was violated by governmental officials. 35 5 It was undisputed that Albertson's
was a completely private entity. As a result, the court "decline[d] to recog-
nize a compensatory cause of action to redress a wholly private entity's in-
fringement of free-speech rights guaranteed by the state constitution. '356
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the court ren-
dered judgment that the volunteers take nothing. 357
351. Id. at 838; TEX. CONST. art. I § 8. Article I, § 8 of the Texas Constitution provides:
"Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of that privilege . I..." Id. (quoting TEX. CONST. art. I § 8).
352. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
353. Albertson's, 856 S.W.2d at 839.
354. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
355. Albertson's, 856 S.W.2d at 840 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-97).
356. Id. at 840 (emphasis added). The court also observed that it had recently refused to
recognize a constitutional action for violations of article I, § 8 of the Texas Constitution in the
absence of state action. Id. at n.7 (citing Weaver v. AIDS Servs., Inc., 835 S.W.2d 798, 802
(Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied)).
357. Id. at 841.
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C. STATUTORY CLAIMS
1. Retaliatory Discharge
The legislative purpose of article 8307c 358 is to "protect persons who are
entitled to benefits under the workers' compensation law and to prevent
them from being discharged by reason of taking steps to collect such bene-
fits." ' 359 A plaintiff bringing an 8307c claim 36° has the burden of establishing
a causal link between the discharge from employment and the claim for
workers' compensation. 361 A plaintiff need not prove that he was discharged
solely because of his workers' compensation claim; he need only prove that
his claim was a determining or contributing factor in his discharge. 362 Thus,
even if other reasons for discharge exist, the plaintiff may still recover dam-
ages if retaliation is also a reason. 363 Causation may be established by direct
or circumstantial evidence and by the reasonable inferences drawn from
such evidence.3 64 Once the link is established, the employer must rebut the
alleged discrimination by showing there was a legitimate reason behind the
discharge.365
Section two of article 8307c provides that a successful plaintiff is entitled
to reasonable damages and is entitled to reinstatement to his or her former
position. 366 The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "reason-
able damages" in section two to embrace both actual and exemplary dam-
358. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1993) (repealed 1993) (current
version at TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 451.001-451.003 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
359. Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. 1980).
360. Williams v. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist., 816 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1991, writ denied). An employee bringing an 8307c cause of action against a govern-
mental unit is not required to comply with the notice provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act,
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(a) (Vernon 1986). Williams, 816 S.W.2d at
839.
361. Paragon Hotel Corp. v. Ramirez, 783 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990,
writ denied). In Paragon, the court identified four factors in concluding that sufficient evi-
dence supported the finding of a causal link between the filing of the claim and the discharge:
(1) those making the decision to discharge the plaintiff were aware of his compensation claim;
(2) those making the decision to discharge the plaintiff expressed a negative attitude toward the
plaintiff's injured condition; (3) the company failed to adhere to established company policies
with regard to progressive disciplinary action; and (4) the company discriminated in its treat-
ment of the plaintiff in comparison to other employees allegedly guilty of similar infractions.
Id. at 658. These four factors may be useful in analyzing whether there is circumstantial
evidence to support a causal link between the filing of a workers' compensation claim and a
subsequent discharge.
362. Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Martin, 844 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1992, writ denied); Ethicon, Inc. v. Martinez, 835 S.W.2d 826, 833 (Tex. App.-Austin
1992, writ denied); Worsham Steel Co, v. Arias, 831 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992,
no writ); Mid-South Bottling Co. v. Cigainero, 799 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990,
writ denied); Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 720 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986), affid,
734 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1987).
363. Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557, 558-59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981,
no writ).
364. Investment Properties Management, Inc. v. Montes, 821 S.W.2d 691, 694 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1991, no writ); Paragon, 783 S.W.2d at 658.
365. Hughes Tool Co. v. Richards, 624 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982).
366. TEX. REV. CIV STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1993) (repealed 1993) (now
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 451-.001-451.003 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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ages.367 Actual damages can include lost past wages, lost future wages, lost
past retirement, lost future retirement, and other benefits which are ascer-
tainable with reasonable certainty. Employees seeking reinstatement on the
ground that they were wrongfully discharged must show that they are pres-
ently able to perform the duties of the job that they had before the injury.368
The federal courts continue to follow Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc. 369 in
finding that article 8307c is a civil action arising under the workers' compen-
sation laws of Texas and, therefore, not removable to federal court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(C). 3 70 However, an article 8307c retaliation claim may
nevertheless be removed if it is pendent to a federal question claim.37 1
The Fifth Circuit recently addressed a related issue in Anderson v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc. 372 Thomas Anderson sued his employer, American Air-
lines (AA), in state court claiming that he had been wrongfully terminated
for filing a worker's compensation claim in violation of article 8307c and the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. AA removed the case to
federal court, contending that Anderson's claims were preempted by both
the Railway Labor Act (RLA) 373 and the Airline Deregulation Act (Avia-
tion Act).3 7 4 Anderson moved to remand the case to state court, but the
federal district court denied his motion. Subsequently, the court granted
AA's motion for summary judgment based upon the preemption claims.
Anderson appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed.
The Fifth Circuit observed that "[t]he RLA dispute resolution provisions
that apply to the airline industry require that 'disputes between an employee
... and a carrier.., growing out of grievances, or out of the interpretation
or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working con-
ditions' must be arbitrated." 37 5 The court noted that these controversies
have been termed "minor disputes. ' 376 State law claims that involve these
disputes are pre-empted. 377 The RLA pre-empts any state claim that neces-
sarily involves the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.
378
367. Azar Nut, 734 S.W.2d at 669.
368. Schrader v. Artco Bell Corp., 579 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
369. 931 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1991). See Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment
and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1765-66 (1992) (discussing
Fifth Circuit's decision in Roadway Express).
370. Roadway Express, 931 F.2d at 1092; see Almaza v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 802 F.
Supp. 1474, 1475 (N.D. Tex. 1992); Keyser v. Kroger Co., 800 F. Supp. 476, 477 (N.D. Tex.
1992); Addison v. Sedco Forex, U.S.A., 798 F. Supp. 1273, 1275 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
371. See Cedillo v. Valcar Enters. & Darling Delaware Co., 773 F. Supp. 932, 939-42
(N.D. Tex. 1991) (workers' compensation retaliation claim could be entertained when pendent
to a related and removable federal question claim under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act).
372. 2 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1993).
373. Id. at 593; 45 U.S.C.A. § 151a (1986). 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1988).
374. Id., 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1308 (Supp. 1993).
375. Anderson, 2 F.3d at 594 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 184).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 595 (citing O'Brien v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 972 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 980 (1993)).
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The court found that Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc. 379 addressed the issue
of whether the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) preempted a
state law claim brought under article 8307c, and held that state law did not
require an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and, there-
fore, the LMRA did not pre-empt the state law claim. 380 The court rejected
AA's argument that preemption under the collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) is broader than that under the LMRA. 38' The court held that an
arbitration decision pursuant to a CBA does not preempt the employee's
claim under article 8307c and that the CBA does not provide a basis for
federal jurisdiction.38 2
With respect to the issue of the Aviation Act's preemption, the court rec-
ognized in Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc.3 83 that the Aviation Act
preempts state laws that regulate rates, routes or services of the airline indus-
try. 3 8 4 AA argued that Anderson's article 8307c claim "relates to" AA's
"services" and the safety of those services. The court disagreed and held
that Anderson's claim for monetary damages was too remote to constitute
regulation of airline rates, services and routes and, therefore, did not pre-
empt Anderson's claim. 385 The Fifth Circuit concluded that removal of the
case was improper and that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear
it.386
In Fuerza Unida v. Levi Strauss & Co. 387 a class of over 1000 former em-
ployees challenged their employer's decision to close one of its manufactur-
ing facilities. The employer's decision was based upon a projected decrease
in production requirements. The plant was closed because it had the highest
cost, including high workers' compensation costs. The employees sued and
alleged that the employer's decision violated article 8307c. The district
court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs
appealed. The plaintiffs argued that the summary judgment was improper
because (1) summary judgment is inappropriate to resolve claims involving
motive and intent, and (2) genuine issues of fact existed as to the claim. The
Fifth Circuit rejected both arguments. First, the court held that summary
judgment is not improper in all article 8307 claims. 388 Second, the court
held that the employees failed to show that they were discriminated against
(or treated differently) since the plant closure resulted in the discharge of all
employees, regardless of whether they had engaged in protested workers'
compensation activities. 389 The court noted that the language of article
8307c plainly states that discharges are prohibited if they are discrimina-
379. 931 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1991).
380. Id. at 1087-88.
381. Id. at 1088.
382. Id. at 1089.
383. Anderson, 2 F.3d at 590.
384. Id. at 597 (citing Morales v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2037 (1992)).
385. Id.
386. Id. at 598.
387. 986 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1993).
388. Id.
389. Id. at 977-78.
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tory. 90 The fact that high workers' compensation costs contributed to the
decision to close the plant did not bring the plant closing within article
8307c. 39 1 The court observe that the plaintiffs' expansive reading of article
8307c would virtually prohibit plant closings in Texas. 392 Because the plain-
tiffs failed to show that there was a fact issue that they were discriminated or
retaliated against for their workers' compensation activities, the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed the summary judgment. 393
In Parham v. Carrier Corp.394 Lynn Parham fell off a loading dock and
into a trash compactor and broke his leg. After the accident, Parham took
an indefinite medical leave of absence. More than a year later, Parham initi-
ated a workers' compensation claim which was later settled. Meanwhile, a
new collective bargaining agreement was implemented which broadened the
scope of Carrier's disability leave program by permitting leaves of absence
for even non-job related injuries, but it placed a twenty-four month cap on
all unpaid leaves of absence. Parham reached the twenty-four month cap
and was on leave five months later when Carrier mailed him a letter which
informed him that he was being terminated pursuant to the disability leave
provisions. Even though Carrier gratuitously allowed Parham six months
following his receipt of the letter to obtain a full medical release, he was
unable to do so. Parham sued Carrier for retaliatory discharge under article
8307c and the jury awarded him more than $275,000 in damages. Carrier
appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment for
Carrier.395
On appeal Parham claimed to have offered evidence that (1) Carrier offi-
cials knew he had filed a workers' compensation claim, (2) Carrier's motive
for firing him was to reduce workers' compensation claims, (3) Carrier retal-
iated against others who had filed such claims, (4) Carrier's absence policy
was not neutrally applied, and (5) he was physically qualified to return to
work.396 The court addressed each factual contention.
First, the court found no evidence that anyone involved in Parham's ter-
mination had actual knowledge of his compensation claim. 397 While
Parham pointed to the obvious inference that an employee on leave for
twenty-four months probably filed a compensation claim, the court held that
such a generalized inference does not suggest a retaliatory motive. 398 Sec-
ond, the court held that Carrier's generalized desire to reduce compensation
claims - in itself - is not impermissible. 399 Parham relied on the deposi-
tion testimony of a Carrier representative who stated, "We were trying to
390. Id. at 979.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 978.
393. Id. at 978-79.
394. 9 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1993).
395. Id.
396. Id.
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eliminate the number of comp claims by improving our safety. '"400 By cling-
ing to the first part of the deposition testimony, the court noted that Parham
conveniently ignored the thrust of Carrier's desire: improving plant safety to
reduce the number of injuries.40 Third, "Carrier's desire to reduce the
number of comp claims by improving... safety is just not evidence of retali-
ation by Carrier against employees who had filed compensation claims. '40 2
Fourth, Parham produced no evidence that the policy was not neutrally ap-
plied. Moreover, the court observed that even if it was not applied neutrally,
it was done so as to benefit Parham - he was given an additional five
months before he received his letter of termination and then an additional
six months to obtain a full medical release. 403 Finally, Parham never ob-
tained a full-duty release to return to work and even sought to be classified
as permanently and completely disabled.4°4 Accordingly, the court reversed
the jury's verdict and rendered a take-nothing judgment against Parham.40 5
In Durbin v. Dal-Briar Corp.40 6 David Durbin worked at Dal-Briar, a talc
mine, for eight years. Durbin began as a truck driver and worked his way up
to head mechanic, and he remained in that position until his termination.
During his employment, Durbin had eight work-related injuries and Dal-
Briar or its insured paid all of his medical expenses. His first seven injuries
were not serious and did not cause him to lose time from work. After his
sixth injury, Mack Minyard told him that if he was injured again Dal-Briar
would terminate his employment. Durbin had a minor seventh injury and
he was not fired. 40 7 Then in August 1989, Durbin was injured when a hy-
draulic motor fell on his hand, crushing his finger. A Dal-Briar employee
took Durbin to a local hospital where the attending physician recommended
amputation of the finger. Durbin would not agree and asked a Dal-Briar
employee of his wish to see a specialist. The employee told Durbin that he
should just have the amputation because more complicated treatment would
simply waste the company's money. Nevertheless, Dal-Briar paid all of his
medical expenses and his finger was saved. Durbin returned to work after
six weeks with instructions to avoid heavy labor and to keep his hand clean.
Dal-Briar re-assigned Durbin to dig a water line with a pick and shovel, then
told him to drill an inch-and-a-half hole in a tractor using an electric hand
drill. Durbin testified that this could not be done and that the drill twisted
up his injured hand. Five days later, Durbin was fired. He was given two
written warnings: in the first he was told he had not maintained his record-
keeping, and in the second, he was told that his inability to drill the hole
required Dal-Briar to send the work to a machine shop and informed him of
his termination. Durbin sued Dal-Briar for violating article 8307c alleging
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 388.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 309.
405. Id.
406. No. 08-92-00409-CV, 1994 WL 32191 (Tex. App.-El Paso Feb. 2, 1994, n.w.h.).
407. Minyard had been terminated in the meantime.
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that it was company policy to terminate employees who were injured on-the-
job, sought workers' compensation benefits, or hire lawyers. At trial,
Durbin was prevented from presenting any evidence of calling any persons
terminated by Dal-Briar who had workers' compensation claims and from
introducing any evidence about any other terminations. The trial court also
prevented Durbin from introducing evidence that mine supervisors had in-
structions from the company that if someone was injured on-the-job that
they would find a way to terminate the injured employee. The jury returned
a take-nothing verdict and the trial court rendered judgment accordingly.
Durbin appealed and the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case
for a new trial.
The court of appeals observed that Durbin's theory of his case was that
Dal-Briar had a routine practice or policy of discriminating against employ-
ees who were injured on-the-job. 4°8 The court held that the trial court's
decision to exclude Durbin's evidence of the other terminations of injured
employees "severely truncated Durbin's case." 4 9 Because the specific inci-
dents Durbin sought to introduce into evidence were substantially similar to
his own termination, they were circumstantial evidence that tended to prove
his 8307c claim.410 The court concluded that the trial court's error in ex-
cluding Durbin's proffered evidence was harmful error, therefore, it reversed
the judgment and remanded the Durbin's claim for a new trial.411
In Sanchez v. Johnson & Johnson Medical, Inc.412 Martha Sanchez was
injured on the job in April 1987. In November 1987, Johnson & Johnson
Medical, Inc. (Johnson) placed her on "indefinite medical lay-off," inform-
ing her that she had "recall rights" under the labor agreement. The em-
ployer's internal documents showed, however, that Sanchez was terminated.
In March 1988 Sanchez was released to light duty work. A personnel assis-
tant for the employer told her that no light duty positions were available at
that time, but that she would be called when one became available. Sanchez
continued to inquire about job openings, but was repeatedly told that none
were available. In early 1989, Johnson's personnel manager promised the
employee that she could have her job back if she could establish that she had
been fully released medically. Sanchez obtained the requested medical re-
lease and was again promised that she would be called. In March 1989
Sanchez' attorney was told by Johnson's personnel manager that Sanchez
was "standing in line" and that it looked good since Johnson was expanding
its work force; however, Sanchez was never called. In March 1988, the evi-
dence revealed that light-duty jobs were in fact available, and that laid-off
408. Id. at *5.
409. Id.
410. Id. The court rejected Dal-Briar's argument that the doctrine of res inter acta applied
and supported the trial court's evidentiary ruling. Id. The doctrine requires that each act or
transaction sued upon must be established by its own particular facts and circumstances and
cannot be established by other incidents or conduct. Id. at *4. The court also rejected Dal-
Briar's argument that evidence of other employment actions would have prejudiced, confused
and misled the jury. Id. at *5-*6.
411. Id. at *8, *10.
412. 860 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ requested).
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employees with less seniority than Sanchez were recalled and new employees
were hired. Moreover, between January 1987 and May 1991, only one em-
ployee who had been laid off for medical reasons was ever recalled.
Sanchez sued Johnson for retaliatory discharge under article 8307c and
common law fraud. The trial court granted Johnson's motion for summary
judgment on the article 8307c claim on the ground that the cause of action
was barred by the statute of limitation. Sanchez appealed and the court of
appeals reversed. 413 The court held that summary judgment on the statute
of limitation was improper because an action must be brought within two
years of the date the employee receives notice of termination or a reasonable
person would know that he or she was terminated. 414 It was therefore in-
cumbent on Johnson to establish as a matter of law the date that Sanchez
received "unequivocal notice of [her] termination. ' 415 Based upon the sum-
mary judgment evidence, the court concluded that there was a fact issue as
to when, if ever, Sanchez had been terminated; therefore, there was a ques-
tion as to when the statute of limitations began to run.416
After a favorable jury trial on Sanchez's fraud claim,41 7 the trial court
granted Johnson's motion for judgment n.o.v. On appeal the court of ap-
peals reversed and rendered judgment for Sanchez on the jury's verdict. 4"8
The court stated that the "essence of the evidence in total" is that Johnson
represented to Sanchez "that she could come back to work, and that she still
had a job," when the employer had actually listed her as terminated only
seven months after her injury.419 The court found that there was evidence
that Johnson never intended to bring Sanchez back to work and that its
representations to Sanchez were false.420 There was also evidence that John-
son used "medical lay-off" as a "subterfuge for actual termination."' 42' Fi-
nally, there was evidence that Sanchez suffered as a result of Johnson's
actions in that she did not seek full-time employment believing that she
would be recalled to her job with Johnson, and accepted other low-paying
jobs. Accordingly, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to sup-
port the jury's verdict. 422 The court also rejected Johnson's argument that
Sanchez's fraud claim was preempted by section 301 of the Labor Manage-
413. Id.
414. Id. at 508.
415. Id. at 509 (citing Thurman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 952 F.2d 128, 134 (5th Cir.
1992)).
416. Id.
417. The elements of a fraud claim are:
(1) that a material representation was made; (2) that it was false; (3) that when
the speaker made it he knew it was false or made it recklessly without any
knowledge of the truth as a positive assertion; (4) that he made it with the inten-
tion that it should be acted upon by the party; (5) that the party acted in reliance
upon it; and (6) that he thereby suffered injury.
Id. at 510 (citing Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. 1977)).
418. Id.






ment Relations Act.4 23 The court explained that the claim would only be
preempted by section 301 if the resolution of the claim is "substantially de-
pendent" on an analysis of the terms of a labor contract. 424 The court found
that it was not necessary to interpret the labor agreement to determine that
Johnson generally misrepresented that Sanchez was still employed and had
recall rights when she actually had no rights because she had been
terminated. 425
In Trevino v. Corrections Corp. of America 426 Lisa Trevino injured her
shoulder while working for her employer. Trevino went on disability leave
and began receiving her weekly compensation. While she was drawing com-
pensation and medical benefits, Trevino's employer sent her a letter inform-
ing her that she would be terminated in accordance with company policy
concerning injured employees receiving workers' compensation beyond six
months. Prior to receiving the letter informing her of her termination, Tre-
vino settled her workers' compensation claim and then filed suit for retalia-
tory discharge under article 8307c. The trial court granted the employer's
motion for summary judgment and the court of appeals reversed. 427 The
court first observed that it was the employer's burden to establish as a matter
of law "no causal link between Trevino's compensation claim and her termi-
nation, i.e.[,] that the claim was not a determining factor in her dis-
charge. '428 The court concluded that the employer's letter informing
Trevino of her discharge "clearly establishes the causal link between Tre-
vino's compensation claim and her termination. ' 429 The court dismissed the
employer's argument that its policy was a neutral policy that applies to all
employees with compensation claims of longer than six months.430 The
court observed that it nevertheless penalizes an employee with a serious in-
jury and files a claim by sending the message that if he draws compensation
for longer than six months, he will be terminated. 43 1
In Acme Boot Co. v. Montenegro432 Salvador Montenegro sued Acme
Boot Company (Acme) for retaliatory discharge. Montenegro originally
worked as a heel laster for Dan Post Boots, a division of Acme, and was later
laid off. Four months later, Acme recalled Montenegro to work for its other
division, Lucchese, as a heel laster. While working for Lucchese, Montene-
gro injured his back when he tried to keep a boot rack from falling over. He
was taken to the hospital and he remained absent from work for two weeks.
Although his evaluations had been very good prior to his injury, after his
423. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
424. Sanchez, 860 S.W.2d at 513 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220
(1985)).
425. Id.
426. 850 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied).
427. Id.
428. Id. at 808 (citing Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 720 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1986), aff'd, 734 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1987)).
429. Id. at 809.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. 862 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ).
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injury his evaluations became unsatisfactory. Several months later, Monte-
negro took a leave of absence for back surgery due to the accident at work.
Several months after his back surgery, Montenegro obtained a medical re-
lease to return to work, but there were no vacancies. Just a few days earlier,
however, Lucchese hired a heel laster. Acme told Montenegro that they
would call him if any openings became available in either division. Acme
had a policy of terminating laid-off employees if they were not recalled
within six months. Eight months after his medical release, Montenegro was
terminated with the notation "Economic Termination/Laid off for 8
months. '433 During this time Acme hired forty-nine new employees
(twenty-three at Lucchese and twenty-six at Dan Post), but Montenegro was
never recalled. The jury found for Montenegro on his claim and Acme
appealed.
On appeal Acme argued that the evidence was factually insufficient to sup-
port the jury's finding of retaliatory discharge in violation of article 8307c.
Acme contended that Montenegro was discharged pursuant to a neutral
company layoff policy and that during the time of his medical release and his
discharge there were no jobs at Lucchese that Montenegro was qualified to
perform. The court observed that Dan Post, however, had several openings
for which Montenegro was qualified. Acme argued that Lucchese and Dan
Post were run entirely separately and that the Dan Post division was irrele-
vant. The court found, however, that there was sufficient evidence that Dan
Post and Lucchese were not run as autonomous divisions of Acme.434 Be-
cause Acme hired several people for positions Montenegro was qualified to
perform while he was on layoff status, the court held that the jury was enti-
tled to conclude that his discharge was motivated by his exercise of his rights
under the workers' compensation laws. 435
In Borden, Inc. v. Guerra 436 Arnold Guerra injured his head when he fell
from his delivery truck. Borden, Inc. (Borden) filed a workers' compensa-
tion claim and Guerra received benefits. Prior to the accident, Guerra had
been recently promoted and there had been no complaints about Guerra's
performance. After the accident, Guerra's supervisor began documenting
customer complaints about Guerra, some of which could not have concerned
Guerra's work and others of which were made by friends of the supervisor.
Also, Borden offered Guerra $25,000 if he did not file a workers' compensa-
tion claim. About two months later, Guerra was fired, and he sued Borden
for retaliatory discharge. The jury awarded Guerra substantial actual dam-
ages and $1,750,000 in punitive damages. Borden appealed.
Borden first argued that Guerra's article 8307c claim was barred because
Borden filed the workers' compensation claim for him. The court rejected
Borden's claim that the Act only protected employees who personally filed
433. Id. at 808.
434. Id.
435. Id. The court also overruled Acme's evidentiary challenges to the jury's finding that
the discharge was willful or malicious and its challenge to the jury's award of $100,000 in
exemplary damages. Id. at 809-11.
436. 860 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ dism'd by agr.).
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claims and observed that such a ruling would permit dishonest employers
with superior knowledge and resources to avoid the punitive policy consider-
ations underlying the Act.437 The court also found that the sudden onset of
documentation concerning Guerra's allegedly poor work performance was a
pretext to justify Guerra's discharge after the filing of a workers' compensa-
tion claim. 43 8
In Tri-County Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Tidwell 439 Richard Tidwell, a
meter reader, injured himself when he jumped a fence to read a meter. He
filed a workers' compensation claim, and subsequently underwent back sur-
gery. Following the surgery, Tidwell returned to work with a medical re-
lease indicating that he could perform his normal duties. Tidwell's back
problems, however, turned out to be more serious, and he had to have addi-
tional surgery. Tidwell then hired an attorney to assist him with his com-
pensation claim. He returned to his employer with a doctor's report that
limited his activities to some extent. Tidwell was told that there were no
jobs available, but that he would be called if there was an opening for a
meter reader. Tidwell was never called, although he claimed there had been
an opening since his termination. Tidwell sued his employer under article
8307c. The jury found for Tidwell. The employer appealed, and the court of
appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the employer. 44°
The court held that the evidence was legally sufficient, but factually insuf-
ficient, to support the issue of liability,44 1 but held that there was legally
insufficient evidence to support an award of damages.442 Finding the evi-
dence legally sufficient as to liability, the court observed that: (1) Tidwell
and a friend, who also had a compensation claim, were fired on the same
day; (2) that Tidwell was unaware of anyone else who had a compensation
claim or who had been fired; and (3) that several years earlier, he had over-
heard his supervisor say that he hoped Tidwell's friend did not hire an attor-
ney, because if he did, he probably would not have a job for long.44 3 Finding
the evidence factually insufficient, however, the court noted that a woman in
the employer's insurance office had been helpful to Tidwell, that the em-
ployer had always required a full medical release before permitting an em-
ployee to return to work, and that the supervisor had nothing to do with the
employer's management. 4 " Most importantly, though, the court found that
Tidwell had been kept on the payroll for approximately two years before he
was terminated and was terminated only when he was unable to obtain a full
release. 445 There was no evidence that anyone connected with Tidwell's ter-
mination had any knowledge concerning the status of his compensation
437. Id. at 521-22.
438. Id. at 523. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the actual
and punitive damages awards. Id. at 523-28.
439. 859 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).
440. Id. at 110.
441. Id. at 111-12.
442. Id. at 113.
443. Id. at 111.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 112.
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claim or that anyone connected with the employer's management was ever
critical of Tidwell's claim." 6 The undisputed evidence showed that Tidwell
was terminated because he was unable to obtain a full medical release, not
because he filed a workers' compensation claim." 7
The court of appeals found that there was legally insufficient evidence to
support the award of actual damages. 44 8 The court observed that the correct
measure of damages is the amount of money the employee would have
earned had he not been discharged, less the sum of money he earned after his
termination." 9 Because Tidwell presented no evidence in support of his
damage claim, the court rendered judgment for the employer. 45 0
2. Commission on Human Rights Act
The Texas Legislature amended the Commission on Human Rights Act
(CHRA) 451 to conform the Act to the federal Civil Rights Act of 1991452
which amended similar federal employment law. The amendments apply to
a complaint of discrimination filed on or after September 1, 1993 .4 5 3 The
amendment broadens the remedies available to victims of discrimination to
mirror federal law. 45 4 In addition to the remedy of reinstatement, back pay,
and perhaps front pay, plaintiffs may recover actual and exemplary damages,
subject to cap by the size of the employer's business.4 55 The caps are:
$50,000 for businesses of 15 to 100 employees; $100,000 for businesses of 101
to 200 employees; $200,000 for businesses of 201 to 500 employees; and
$300,000 for businesses of more than 500 employees. 456 The damages sub-
ject to the caps are in addition to back or front pay, which are not covered
by federal or state law.
In the past, the Act's definition of a "person with a disability" did not
include persons "regarded as impaired" by the defendant, but who are really
not impaired.457 The amendment adds this category of persons within the
Act's protection.
Appropriately, elected public officials are covered by the Act for the first
time.458 Also, private employers may use as a defense to a discrimination
claim their own work force diversity program and educational outreach to
historical victims of discrimination (which state employers are required to
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 113.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001-21.306 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
452. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 16
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.)
453. Act of Sept. 1, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 276, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1285 (to be
codified at TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.001) (historical notes).
454. Id.
455. Id. ch. 276, § 7.
456. Id.





The burden of proof in disparate impact cases are also made by the
amendments. A disparate impact case involves a challenge to a facially neu-
tral employment practice (such as achievement tests) which may have a dis-
criminatory impact in practice. An employer must now prove that such
practices, if challenged, are job-related and consistent with business
necessity.46°
A plaintiff must file suit within two years of the conduct that allegedly
caused the discrimination, rather than one year under prior law.46 1 Though
unchanged by the amendments, jury trials will be available under the Act
consistent with the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Caballero v. Central
Power & Light C0.462 Under the amendments, the Commission on Human
Rights is directed to establish an Office of Dispute Resolution to which
either party to a charge of discrimination may refer the matter. 463 While not
binding unless the parties agree, the process should benefit employers and
employees alike. In a similar vein, the amendments expressly recognize and
approve the use of private dispute resolution. 464 The settlement of any claim
under this procedure will be binding on the parties.
In Caballero4 65 Richard Caballero was employed by Central Power &
Light Co. (CAL) as a lineman. Caballero began experiencing back problems
and was examined by a doctor selected by CAL. Following the exam, the
doctor told Caballero that Caballero would no longer be able to work as a
lineman. Caballero was offered an office manager's job by CAL, but he re-
fused and quit his job. Caballero sued CAL for discrimination based upon
his handicap in violation of the Commission on Human Rights Act
(CHRA).466 In response to five jury questions, the jury found that Caballero
had a handicap, that the handicap did not impair his ability to perform the
duties of a lineman, that the decision to remove Caballero as a lineman was
not justified by business necessity, that Caballero had $33,000 loss of earn-
ings in the past and $200,000 loss of earning capacity in the future, and that
Caballero was entitled to attorney's fees. CAL appealed and argued that the
trial court erred on three counts: (1) in submitting Caballero's claim to a
jury because the CHRA requires the trial court to proceed in equity; (2) in
rendering judgment for damages in an equitable proceeding; and (3) in ren-
dering judgment for damages where Caballero failed to prove non-compli-
ance with a court order. The court of appeals agreed with CAL and
459. Id. ch. 276, § 4.
460. Id. ch 269, § 1.
461. Id. ch. 276, § 7.
462. 858 S.W.2d 359, 360 (Tex. 1993).
463. Id. ch. 276, § 6.
464. Id.
465. 858 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. 1993).
466. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1993). See Philip J.
Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45
Sw. L.J. 331, 351-52 (1991) (discussing Caballero facts).
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reversed and remanded the case.467 The Texas Supreme Court reversed. 46 8
The supreme court held that Caballero need not first obtain an injunction
against CAL's wrongful conduct and then sue for violation of injunctive or-
der.469 On remand to the court of appeals, the court held that Caballero's
claim was barred because he failed to file his suit within one year after the
discrimination complaint was filed with the Commission. 470 The court re-
jected Caballero's argument that CAL's failure to plead the statute as a de-
fense constituted a waiver of the argument.471 The court held that the issue
was jurisdictional and could be raised for the first time on appeal. 472
In Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. 473 Robert Bernard, senior
litigation counsel for Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. (BFI), alleged, among
other things, that he was terminated from his position as senior litigation
counsel because of his age. BFI moved for summary judgment on the basis
that Bernard failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the CHRA.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and
Bernard appealed. On appeal Bernard argued that (1) an aggrieved person is
not required to exhaust the administrative process when irreparable harm
may occur and the administrative agency is unable to provide immediate
relief; and (2) that he exhausted his administrative remedies by filing his
charge of discrimination with the Commission while simultaneously filing
his original petition in the trial court on the same day. The court of appeals
correctly rejected Bernard's arguments. The court held that the Texas
Supreme Court made it clear in Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc. 474 that a
statutory prerequisite to filing suit in district court was the filing of a com-
plaint with the Commission. 475 The court added that Schroeder also re-
quires the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a mandatory prerequisite
to filing a civil action in district court. 476 The court concluded that Bernard
did not exhaust his administrative remedies by filing his complaint with the
Commission and his original petition in district court on the same day, or by
ultimately receiving a "right to sue" letter from the Commission. 477 As the
court observed, "to permit original judicial action without giving the agency
a chance to act" would make the Commission's role meaningless. 478
In Farrington v. Sysco Food Services479 Willie Farrington contended that
during his employment he was harassed because of his race and afforded
467. Caballero, 804 S.W.2d at 534.
468. 858 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. 1993).
469. Id. at 361.
470. Central Power & Light Co. v. Caballero, No. 04-94-00112-CV, 1994 WL 5703, at * 2
(citing Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 487 n.10 (Tex. 1991)).
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. No. 01-92-00134-CV, 1993 WL 414700 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 14,
1993, motion for rehearing pending).
474. 813 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. 1991).
475. Bernard, 1993 WL 414700 at *3 (citing Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 485).
476. Id. (citing Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 488).
477. Id. at *4.
478. Id.
479. 865 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
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fewer advancement opportunities and less compensation on the basis of his
race. Sysco Food Services (Sysco), on the other hand, argued that it never
harassed Farrington and that he received less job responsibilities and pay
because he lacked seniority in comparison with other employees at Farring-
ton's same job level. Farrington did not contest Sysco's evidence. In addi-
tion, Sysco contended that Farrington was fired after he admitted that he
may have been under the influence of cocaine while on the job. Presented
with this evidence, the trial court granted Sysco's motion for summary judg-
ment, and Farrington appealed.
The court of appeals observed that Farrington must first establish a prime
facie case of discrimination by establishing that the failure to promote him to
either manager position was racially motivated, and then the burden would
shift to Sysco to prove legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the deci-
sion.480 Sysco attached evidence of Farrington's deposition testimony in
which he admitted that all four of the managers promoted had more senior-
ity with Sysco than he did. The burden of production then shifted back to
Farrington to show that the reason proffered by Sysco was a pretext for race
discrimination. Because Farrington produced no evidence that the seniority
system was a pretext for race discrimination, the court affirmed the sum-
mary judgment.481 The court also concluded that Farrington brought forth
no evidence of harassment and that summary judgment was also proper.482
In Hennigan v. LP. Petroleum Co. 483 Lois Hennigan and her husband
worked for the same employer at the same facility. Lois filed for divorce
against her husband and obtained a restraining order, preventing the hus-
band from "going about" the employer's facility. The day after Lois served
her husband with the restraining order, Lois' employer terminated her. Lois
then filed suit, contending, among other things, that she was terminated in
violation of the CHRA because she is female. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for the employer and Lois appealed. The court of appeals
affirmed. 484 The court of appeals agreed that Lois admitted in her deposi-
tion testimony that she was not terminated because of her gender, thereby
defeating her sex discrimination claim.485
Stinnett v. Williamson County Sheriffis Department486 involves the rela-
tionship between the CHRA and the Whistleblower Act.487 Jim Stinnett
was a patrol officer and while employed by the Williamson County Sheriffs
480. Id. at 251.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 252.
483. 848 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Beaumont), rev'd on other grounds, 858 S.W.2d 371
(Tex. 1993).
484. Id. at 280.
485. Id. at 278. The dissent argued, in a melodramatic fashion, that "[b]asically this suit is
crucial to feminist rights if not the entire feminist movement." Id. at 280 (Brookshire, J.,
dissenting). It does not appear that the CHRA was enacted to support the "feminist" move-
ment or any other political movement, but to assure non-discriminatory treatment of all wo-
men in the terms and conditions of employment - whether the women are feminists or not.
The premise of Justice Brookshire's argument is unclear.
486. 858 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
487. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 554.002 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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Department he filed a sworn complaint with the Commission asserting that
the sheriff's department discriminated against him based on his age. Subse-
quently, the department terminated Stinnett's employment, and he filed suit
alleging a retaliatory dismissal in violation of the Whistleblower Act. The
defendant filed special exceptions to the plaintiff's pleading, contending that
the plaintiff had not stated a cause of action. After Stinnett attempted to
resolve the inadequacies in the pleading, the trial court determined that fur-
ther amendments would be futile, and dismissed the case. Stinnett appealed.
On appeal, the department argued that the plaintiff's sole remedy for age
discrimination was pursuant to the CHRA. The department further argued
that Stinnett's attempt to bootstrap his age discrimination case to the
Whistleblower Act misconstrued the policy behind the Whistleblower Act.
The court agreed.488 The court reasoned that the Whistleblower Act was
created to encourage public employees to report their employer's violation of
laws and rules that affect the public good or society as whole.489 The court
noted that Stinnett's charge involved a violation of a law that affected but
one person: Stinnett. 490 The court held that Stinnett could not bootstrap his
discrimination claim into a claim under the Whistleblower Act, which pro-
vides more advantageous remedies and special venue provisions.491 There-
fore, Stinnett did not state a cause of action under the Whistleblower Act.
The court affirmed the dismissal on a second ground as well.492 The court
explained that a specific statute controls over a more general statute.493 Be-
cause the CHRA is the more specific statute, the CHRA govern's the em-
ployee's claim for retaliation rather than the Whistleblower Act.494
In Ridgway's, Inc. v. Payne495 Louise Payne, the surviving wife of a Ridg-
way's employee, filed suit against the company, individually and as in-
dependent executrix of her husband's estate, claiming that Ridgway's
discriminated unlawfully against her husband based on age. Payne con-
tended that by reducing life insurance benefits for employees over the age of
sixty-five by thirty-five percent, Ridgway's impermissibly discriminated in
terms of its employee benefit plan. Payne based her claim on the CHRA.
The CHRA contains a provision, similar to a provision of the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 496 which allows employers to
maintain benefit plans with differing standards of compensation and terms, if
the plan is not created to evade the dictates of the ADEA.497 In 1990, the
ADEA was amended, changing this provision to provide older workers with




492. Id. at 576.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 577.
495. 853 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
496. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
497. Id. at 661; see TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.001 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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more protection; however, the amendment has only a prospective effect. 498
At the trial court, Payne relied on the amendment to support her motion for
summary judgment. The trial court granted Payne's motion. Ridgway's ap-
pealed, and the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for
Ridgway's. 499
Ridgway's contended that Payne lacked standing, individually, to bring
this suit and the court agreed. °° The court stated that the age discrimina-
tion claim was personal to the Payne's deceased husband; therefore, only the
husband, as the person whose primary legal right had been breached, could
seek redress.50' Ridgway's also asserted that Payne could not bring the suit
as independent executrix because Payne did not exhaust the administrative
remedies that serve as a statutory prerequisite to filing suit for age discrimi-
nation. Ridgway's specifically asserted that Payne did not file a complaint
with the Commission within 180 days of the discriminatory act. The court
agreed, concluding that the husband's cause of action accrued when the plan
decreasing his life insurance was adopted, or when the adoption was commu-
nicated to him.50 2 Because the accrual date was more than 180 days before
Payne filed a complaint with the Commission, the claim was time-barred.50 3
In Adams v. Valley Federal Credit Union 504 Sue Adams sued her em-
ployer for age discrimination when she was fired after more than eighteen
years of employment. The jury found against Adams on her age discrimina-
tion claim. Adams then appealed the adverse jury verdict, contending that
the trial court improperly submitted the age discrimination claim because (1)
the question should have been submitted in granulated form and (2) the
question was submitted in a broad form without her proposed instruction. 50 5
The court of appeals disagreed. 50 6 The court first noted that Texas law re-
quires broad form submission and that broad form submission was appropri-
ate in this case.507 Next, the court addressed the plaintiff's contention that
the trial court erred by not submitting the two-pages of instructions Adams
requested. The court noted that the instruction's purposes were to inform
the jury of the burdens of the parties and to set forth the elements of the
cause of action.508 The court further noted that with broad form submis-
sions, instructions have become even more important to the fair and just
498. Ridgway's, 853 S.W.2d at 661 n.2; see TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.001 (Vernon Supp.
1994) (historical notes).
499. Ridgway's, 853 S.W.2d at 661.




504. 848 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
505. The court submitted the question as follows: "Do you find from a preponderance of
the evidence that defendant fired plaintiff because of her age?" Id. at 186. Adams requested a
two-page instruction. Id. at 186 & n.3.
506. Id.
507. Id. at 185 (citing Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1990);
Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Tex. Sav. Ass'n, 710 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1986)).
508. Id.
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determination of parties' claims.50 9 In this case, there were no instructions,
except boilerplate definitions. The court reasoned that because an age dis-
crimination case has a complicated burden-shifting element, the jury should
have been instructed on this element. 510 Referring to Lakeway Land Co. v.
Kizer,5 11 the court explained that trial courts should pattern their instruc-
tions in discrimination cases after the instructions provided in discrimination
cases heard in federal court.51 2 Therefore, trial courts should instruct the
jury that they must first determine if the plaintiff presented aprimefacie case
of discrimination. 51 3 If they find that the plaintiff established the prime facie
case, the jury must determine if the defendant stated a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employment decision.5 14 With this established,
the jury must then consider whether this reason was actually a pretext for
the discrimination.51 5 If the reason was a pretext, the trial court must in-
struct the jury to find that the defendant impermissibly discriminated against
the plaintiff.51 6 Consequently, the court concluded that broad form submis-
sion is proper in lawsuits involving discrimination claims; however, the jury
must receive proper instructions regarding the burden-shifting element of
the claim.5 17 The instructions submitted by Adams were not in substantially
correct form as required by Rule 278,518 therefore, Adams failed to preserve
the error for appellate review.5 19
The Texas Attorney General issued an opinion in which he concluded that
under the CHRA the state commission may file civil suits in state district
court.5 20 In this letter opinion, the Attorney General addressed the issue of
whether local commissions, created pursuant to Section 4.02-.04 of the
CHRA, may also file suit in state district court, as opposed to municipal or
county court. The Attorney General concluded that under certain circum-
stances, a local commission may file suit in state district court. When a local
commission is filling the role normally reserved for the state commission, the
local commission may then file in district court. The Attorney General
noted that this circumstance will be rare and will only arise when the federal
or state commission has referred a complaint to the local commission, or if
the Attorney General has deferred jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint to the local commission.
509. Id.
510. Id. at 187.
511. 796 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).





517. Id. at 187.
518. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 278.
519. Adams, 848 S.W.2d at 188.
520. 93-10 Op. Tex. Atty. Gen. LO-93-10 (Feb. 17, 1993).
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3. Unemployment Compensation Act 52 1
In Kaminski v. Texas Employment Commission 522 Robert Kaminski, an
at-will employee, was terminated after he refused to submit to a urinalysis
for drugs. The employer previously informed all of its employees of the new
testing requirement, and Kaminski signed the notice believing that signing
the notice was a condition to his continued employment. Later, Kaminski
received a second notice, informing him that he was to submit to testing.
Again, Kaminski signed the notice believing that submission to the testing
was a condition of his employment. At the time of Kaminski's test, how-
ever, he refused his consent and the employer terminated him. Kaminski
subsequently filed for unemployment compensation with the Texas Employ-
ment Commission (TEC). The TEC denied the request for compensation,
finding that refusing to submit to the urinalysis was job-related misconduct.
Kaminski appealed the TEC determination to the district court, but the trial
court affirmed the TEC's decision by granting the TEC's motion for sum-
mary judgment.
Kaminski appealed to the court of appeals and argued that the TEC's
decision was erroneous because the Unemployment Compensation Act (the
Act) does not provide that refusal to submit to a urinalysis constitutes mis-
conduct. Kaminski also argued that even if the Act does so provide, denial
of unemployment compensation in such circumstances violates his right to
privacy under both the Texas and United States Constitutions. First, the
court reasoned that "misconduct" includes violations of reasonable policies
and rules employers adopt to ensure an orderly and safe workplace. 52 3 The
court held that the employer's urinalysis policy was reasonable because (1) it
was applied to all employees, and (2) it was instituted after the employer
discovered evidence of on-the-job drug use and the employer's major client
notified the employer that all contract employees must be tested.524 Second,
the court determined that denial of unemployment benefits in such circum-
stances does not violate either the Texas or United States Constitutions be-
cause Kaminski's employer is a private employer, therefore, constitutional
protections are not implicated.5 25
In Nuernberg v. Texas Employment Commission 526 Alfred Nuernberg was
terminated from his employment for sexual harassment and poor perform-
ance. Nuernberg sought unemployment benefits, but the TEC found that he
was discharged because of misconduct. Specifically, the TEC found that
Nuernberg mismanaged his position because despite prior counseling, Nu-
ernberg followed female co-workers to their cars and followed them
throughout the day and after work. Nuernberg appealed. Nuernberg con-
521. The Unemployment Compensation Act is now codified in TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§§ 201.001-201.101 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
522. 848 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
523. Id. at 811.
524. Id.
525. Id. at 813.
526. 846 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 858 S.W.2d 364
(Tex. 1993).
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tended that the TEC's decision was not correct because the employer did not
establish that he intentionally mismanaged his position and, therefore, he
was not disqualified from receiving benefits. The court observed that mis-
management constitutes "a degree of careless behavior that shows a disre-
gard for the consequences. '527 The court held that the employer counseled
Nuernberg to stop harassing female employees and warned him that contin-
uing this behavior would result in his termination. 528 The court concluded
that this repeated misconduct was substantial evidence of mismanage-
ment5 29  and affirmed the TEC decision to deny unemployment
compensation. 530
In Levelland Independent School District v. Contreras531 Emilio Contreras
filed suit to appeal a TEC decision denying him unemployment compensa-
tion benefits. The district court agreed with Contreras and reversed the TEC
decision. Subsequently, the employer appealed the trial court's ruling; how-
ever, the TEC chose not to appeal. Contreras moved to dismiss the appeal
contending that article 522lb-4(i) prohibits those appeals in which the TEC
refuses to join.532 The court of appeals disagreed. 533 The court noted that
article 522lb-4(i) does require that all prevailing parties be made party to an
appeal of a TEC determination, but the Article does not require that all
losing parties join.534 The court reasoned that such a requirement would be
unfair because the interests of the employer and the TEC are not always the
same. 535 Therefore, the court determined that an appeal need not be dis-
missed merely because both the employer and the TEC have not joined in
the appeal. 536
Recently, the TEC issued several decisions that. consider the issue of
whether certain home health care workers are employees, and if so, of whom
they are employed.5 37 In each case, the TEC's analysis began from the
premise that if an individual receives wages for performing a service, the
individual is presumed to be employed, unless the TEC determines that the
individual is free from control or direction over the performance of his or
her work. The TEC then focused on the characteristics of the specific work
situations.
The TEC noted that certain work characteristics denote employment, in-
cluding: (1) the payment of wages on an hourly, weekly or monthly basis;
(2) control and direction of the worker by the service-recipient; (3) a contin-
527. Id. at 43 (citing Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986)).
528. Id.
529. Id. at 44.
530. Id.
531. 850 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
532. Id. at 230. Section 212.301(b) reads: "Each other party to the proceeding before the
Commission must be made a defendant in an action under this subchapter." TEX. LAB. CODE
ANN. § 212.301(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994).




537. In re Gilson, TD-92-156-1192; In re Davis, TD-91-092-0591; In re Crass, TD-92-150-
0992; In re Dallas County Nurses, TD-92-049-0292.
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uing relationship between the worker and the service-recipient; (4) the per-
formance of the service on the recipient's premises and/or with the
recipient's equipment; (5) the worker's full-time delivery of the services; (6)
the unskilled nature of the work performed; and (7) the requirement that the
worker personally perform the service. Using this framework of analysis,
the TEC found that if a home care worker is performing services for a ser-
vice-recipient who exercises control over the worker, pays the worker his or
her wages, and directly hires the worker, the service-recipient is the worker's
employer. In some instances, the TEC has determined that a referral agency
is a worker's employer. This relationship develops when the referral agency
(1) screens the workers, requiring them to submit an application; (2) dictates
guidelines for the performance of the services; (3) establishes or approves the
workers' compensation schemes; (4) supervises the workers; and (5) dictates
the workers' schedules. The TEC discounts any attempts by the service-
recipients or referral agencies to avoid liability for unemployment compensa-
tion contributions by requiring workers to assert that they are self-employed.
The TEC staunchly dictated that employers may not transfer their contribu-
tion requirements by agreement.
III. NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS
Generally, an agreement not to compete is a restraint of trade and is unen-
forceable because it violates public policy. 538 The Texas Constitution de-
clares that monopolies created by the state or a political subdivision are not
permitted because they are contrary to the "genius of a free government." 
539
In 1889, the Texas legislature enacted its first antitrust law, and it remained
almost unchanged until the passage of the Texas Free Enterprise and Anti-
trust Act of 1983. 540 Generally, this legislation prohibits contracts, combi-
nations or conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade or commerce.
54 1
Historically, Texas courts have closely scrutinized private sector contracts
which restrain trade.5 42 However, the Covenant Not to Compete Act
543
protects noncompetition agreements if they meet certain statutory
538. Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. 1991); Martin v.
Credit Protection Ass'n, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1990); DeSantis v. Wackenhut
Corp., 793 S.W.2d 681, 681 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, I I I S. Ct. 755 (1991) (citing Frankiewicz
v. National Comp. Assocs., 633 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. 1982); Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v.
Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 186 (1981)); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660,
662 (Tex. 1990); Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 659 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992,
no writ).
539. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 26.
540. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.51 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1993).
541. The Texas Supreme Court noted in DeSantis that while a noncompetition agreement
is a restraint on trade, only those contracts that unreasonably restrain trade violate the Texas
Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 687.
542. See e.g., Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 385-86 (Tex. 1991);
Queens Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397 (1893); Ladd v. Southern Cotton Press &
Mfg. Co., 53 Tex. 172 (1880). See Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and
Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1785-97 (1992) (analyzing
factors).
543. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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criteria.544
In Light v. Centel Cellular Co. 545 Light began working for United Teles-
pectrum, Inc. (United) as a salesperson in 1985. In 1987, Light signed an
employment agreement with United. The agreement provided that Light
was terminable at the will of either Light or United. The agreement also
included a covenant by which Light agreed not to compete with United in a
certain geographical area for a one year period following her termination.
Following her resignation, Light sued Centel, the successor in interest to
United, asserting that the noncompetition agreement was unenforceable and
void. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Light. The court of
appeals reversed and rendered judgment that Light take nothing against
Centel, holding that the covenant not to compete was enforceable, and Light
appealed. The Supreme Court withdrew its original opinion 54 6 and granted
544. The Covenant Not to Compete Act provides that a noncomplete covenant is enforcea-
ble if it:
is ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the
agreement is made to the extent that it contains limitations as to time, geograph-
ical area, and scope of activity to be restrained that are reasonable and do not
impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other
business interest of the promisee.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1994). Section 15.51(c) provides:
If the covenant is found to be ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable
agreement but contains limitations as to time, geographical area, or scope of
activity to be restrained that are not reasonable and impose a greater restraint
than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the prom-
isee, the court shall reform the covenant to the extent necessary to cause the
limitations contained in the covenant as to time, geographical area, and scope of
activity to be restrained to be reasonable and to impose a restraint that is not
greater than necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the
promisee and enforce the covenant as reformed, except that the court may not
award the promisee damages for a breach of the covenant before its reformation
and the relief granted to the promisee shall be limited to injunctive relief. If the
primary purpose of the agreement to which the covenant is ancillary is to obli-
gate the promisor to render personal services, the promisor establishes that the
promisee knew at the time of the execution of the agreement that the covenant
did not contain limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to
be restrained that were reasonable and the limitations imposed a greater re-
straint than necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the
promisee, and the promisee sought to enforce the covenant to a greater extent
than was necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the
promisee, the court may award the promisor the costs, including reasonable at-
torney's fees, actually and reasonably incurred by the promisor in defending the
action to enforce the covenant.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994) (historical note).
545. 841 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1993, writ granted).
546. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 17 (Oct. 6, 1993). The Texas Supreme Court, relying on its prior
decisions in Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990) and Travel
Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1992), originally held that the covenant
was not ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement, was an unreasonable restraint of
trade, and was unenforceable on the grounds of public policy. In so holding, the court rea-
soned that an "employment agreement" consisting entirely of a covenant not to compete and
containing no terms or provisions usually associated with an employment contract was not an
"otherwise enforceable agreement." Furthermore, the court reasoned that the employment-at-
will relationship could not be considered an "otherwise enforceable agreement" because the at-
will relationship could be terminated at any time by either party. The Texas Supreme Court
specifically declined to determine whether Sections 15.50 and 15.51 of the Texas Business and
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rehearing of the cause.547
In General Devices, Inc. v. Bacon 548 the court of appeals held that the
covenant not to compete at issue was unenforceable and that there was suffi-
cient evidence of damages on the plaintiffs tortious interference with con-
tract claim to present a fact issue for the jury.549 Bacon sought review of the
decision in the supreme court on the severability of an unenforceable cove-
nant not to compete and the availability of a claim for tortious interference
with the remaining contract. In light of Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star
Tours,550 the Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the
court of appeals.55'
In Burgess v. Permian Court Reporters, Inc.55 2 Stanley Burgess filed an
appeal from a temporary injunction restraining him from participating in
court reporting within a fifty-mile radius of Permian Court Reporters, Inc.
location in the Midland-Odessa area. Burgess argued that the contract be-
tween Permian and himself was not an "otherwise enforceable agreement"
because it was severable by either party at any time and for any reason, thus
creating merely an at-will relationship. The court of appeals agreed.553 Be-
cause Permian was not obligated to give Burgess jobs, and Burgess was free
to decide whether or not to take jobs that were offered, the two parties were
"bound to do or refrain from certain acts only if Permian gave Burgess work
and if Burgess accepted it."' 554 The court noted that the Texas Supreme
Court has "held specifically that a covenant not to compete executed during
an at-will relationship is not ancillary to an enforceable agreement and is
unenforceable as a matter of law." 555
In Car Wash Systems, Inc. v. Brigance 556 Car Wash brought suit against
Brigance, its former employee, for breach of a noncompetition agreement
and for injunctive relief to prevent future breaches of the agreement. Bri-
gance was hired by Car Wash in 1984. On February 20, 1987, Brigance
signed an employment agreement, which changed his status from an em-
ployee-at-will to an employee terminable only for cause. The agreement pro-
vided that the employment period would be for one year, unless extended
from year to year or otherwise agreed to between the parties. The employ-
ment agreement also contained a covenant not to compete, by which Bri-
gance agreed not to compete with Car Wash for a period of one year
following his termination date. Furthermore, the agreement provided that
Commerce Code or the 1993 amendments to those sections would apply retroactively, noting
that the application of those sections or their amendments "would not require a result in this
case different from the one we reach today."
547. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 426-27 (Feb. 2, 1994) (argued Feb. 17, 1994).
548. 836 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991), rev'd per curiam, 830 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.
1992).
549. Id. at 182-85.
550. 827 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1991).
551. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 806.
552. 864 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ requested).
553. Id. at 727.
554. Id. at 727-28.
555. Id. at 728.
556. 856 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, no writ).
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no variation of the agreement would be valid unless in writing and signed by
all parties. In 1992, Brigance resigned from Car Wash and immediately be-
gan working for a competing business.
The trial court denied Car Wash's application for temporary injunction.
In so doing, the trial court reasoned that the employment agreement ended
on February 20, 1988, at the expiration of the one year initial employment
period, because there was no writing extending the employment period be-
yond the first year. The one year covenant not to compete, then, began to
run on February 20, 1988, and expired long before the injunction was
sought. Car Wash appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded
the case, directing the trial court to enter a temporary injunction against
Brigance. 57 The court of appeals explained that the employment agree-
ment, though initially for only a one year employment period, was extended
from year to year and was in full force on the date of Brigance's resigna-
tion.558 The court noted that the language of the agreement simply did not
support the trial court's construction that a writing was required to extend
the term of the employment agreement. 559 Thus, the one year covenant not
to compete extended for one year after Brigance's employment with Car
Wash and not for one year after Brigance's initial employment period termi-
nated. 56° Otherwise, the court noted, the non-compete period would have
run from February 20, 1988, to February 20, 1989, while Brigance was still
employed by Car Wash.5 6 1
In Meineke Discount Muffler v. Jaynes 56 2 a franchisor, Meineke Discount
Muffler Shops ("Meineke"), sued two of its former franchise owners for vio-
lating the licensing agreement's covenant not to compete. The covenant pro-
hibited the franchisees from operating another competitive business during
the duration of the agreement and for one year following the termination
within a twenty-mile radius form the Meineke location. The franchisees vio-
lated the agreement by opening a competing business at the same location.
The franchisees argued that the covenant not to compete was invalid as a
matter of law. The district court ruled in favor of Meineke finding that the
franchisees violated the legally valid covenant not compete. The franchisees
appealed, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Analyzing the case under the Cov-
enant Not to Compete Act,5 63 the court first found that the covenant not to
compete was ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement (the franchise
license).564 Second, the court held that the covenant's prescriptions on time
and geography (one year/twenty-mile restriction) were reasonable. 565 The
557. Id. at 859.




562. 999 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1993).
563. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
564. Jaynes, 999 F.2d at 123 n.5.
565. Id. at 123 (citing Ruscitto v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 777 F.
Supp. 1349, 1354 (N.D. Tex.), affd, 948 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
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court also found that the covenant did not impose a greater restraint than
necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interests of Meineke. 566
The court observed that the district court found that Meineke spent consid-
erable resources to promote name-recognition for products and services be-
ing offered by its franchises.
IV. BEYOND NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS
In addition to actions based on a breach of contract theory arising from a
noncompetition agreement, employers may rely on various causes of action
to protect trade secrets against appropriation by former employees and dis-
closure to competitors. 567 An employer may sue for unfair competition,
which is based on fraud in which a party has suffered or will suffer conse-
quential harm. Two elements are necessary to obtain injunctive or mone-
tary relief - existence of a trade secret and its unconsented use or
disclosure. This cause of action is separate and apart from any breach of
contract for alleged violation of a noncompetition agreement. Additionally,
an employer may sue for breach of nondisclosure contract, if one exists, or
breach of confidential relationship.5 68
In Texas, a trade secret is defined as:
[A]ny formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating
or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list
of customers .... 569
Secrecy is key to establishing the existence of a trade secret. 570 The informa-
tion may not be readily available or generally known. 571 "However, when
money and time are invested in the development of a procedure or device
which is based on an idea which is not new to a particular industry, and
when that certain procedure or device is not generally known, trade secret
1994 (1992); Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Group. P.A., 805 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied); Property Tax Assocs., Inc. v. Staffeldt, 800 S.W.2d 349,
352 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied); Posey v. Monier Resources, Inc., 768 S.W.2d
915, 918-19 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied)).
566. Id. at 123-24 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
567. See also Richey & Bosik, Trade Secrets and Restrictive Covenants, 4 LAB. LAw. 21
(1988).
568. Gonzales v. Zamora, 791 S.W.2d 258, 265 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ)
("Protection is available even in the absence of an express agreement not to disclose materials;
when a confidential relationship exists, the law will imply an agreement not to disclose trade
secrets.").
569. Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
898 (1958) (adopting definition in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)); see M.
N. Dannenbaum, Inc. v. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d 624, 631 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, writ denied); Murrco Agency, Inc. v. Ryan, 800 S.W.2d 600, 604-05 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1990, no writ) (customer lists and pricing information are trade secrets).
570. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d at 631.
571. Gonzales, 791 S.W.2d at 264 (suit involving breach of confidential relationship and
unfair competition).
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protection will exist."' 572 One court placed importance on the efforts made
by the employer to keep the information at issue from competitors.5 73 Thus,
if the information provides a competitive advantage to its user, it may be a
trade secret. 574 Other factors considered by the courts include the existence
of a nondisclosure agreement and the nature and extent of security precau-
tions to prevent unauthorized disclosure or use of the information.575 On
the other hand, where the procedures and equipment used in a business are
well known within an industry or generally known and readily available, the
training and knowledge gained by an employee about the procedures are
unlikely to be considered protectable interests.576 Additionally, former em-
ployees are free to use general knowledge, skill, and experience acquired dur-
ing employment5 77 or information publicly disclosed.5 78
Generally, employers can protect secret customer lists and other confiden-
tial information from use by former employees and preclude the employee
from using it in competition with the employer. Some Texas cases analyze
the difficulty in obtaining customer lists in determining whether such lists
are confidential information and hold that if the information is readily acces-
sible by industry inquiry, then the lists are not protected, 579 while other
Texas cases hold that even if the information is readily accessible, if the com-
petitor gained the information in usable form while working for the former
employer, then the information is protected. 580 For example, a former em-
ployee may not use knowledge of purchasing agents and credit ratings of the
customers of his former employer to compete against that employer. 581 Sim-
ilarly, one court granted an injunction to prevent a former employee from
572. Id. (emphasis added); see Bryan v. Kershaw, 366 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 386 U.S. 959 (1967); Ventura Mfg. Co. v. Locke, 454 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1970, no writ).
573. Gonzales, 791 S.W.2d at 265.
574. Murrco Agency, 800 S.W.2d at 605 n.7.
575. See Daily Int'l Sales v. Eastman Whipstock, 662 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ); Rimes v. Club Corp. of Am., 542 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (information learned during employment for which there was no
duty of nondisclosure imposed by the employer may be used freely by the employee after
employment termination).
576. Recon Exploration, Inc. v. Hodges, 798 S.W.2d 848, 852 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no
writ) (geophysical exploration procedures known in the trade); Gonzales, 791 S.W.2d at 264;
Hall v. Hall, 326 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (manner of
making and installing product widely known); see also Wissman v. Boucher, 150 Tex. 326, 330,
240 S.W.2d 278, 279 (1951) (common knowledge is not a trade secret).
577. Executive Tele-Communications Sys. v. Buchbaum, 669 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
578. Gonzales, 791 S.W.2d at 764.
579. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d at 632-33 (citing Numed, Inc. v. McNutt, 724 S.W.2d 432,
434-35 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ); Allan J. Richardson & Assoc., Inc. v. An-
drews, 718 S.W.2d 833, 836-37 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ); Brooks, 503
S.W.2d at 684-85; Research Equip. Co. v. C. H. Galloway & Scientific Cages, Inc., 485 S.W.2d
953, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ); SCM Corp. v. Triplett Co., 399 S.W.2d 583,
568-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, no writ)).
580. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d at 633 (citing American Precision Vibrator Co. v. National
Air Vibrator Co., 764 S.W.2d 274, 276-78 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ));
Jeter, 607 S.W.2d at 275-76; Crouch, 468 S.W.2d at 607-08.
581. Crouch, 468 S.W.2d at 605-07.
SMU LAW REVIEW
competing against his former employer through the use of disparaging re-
marks about his former employer's products based on the employee's inside
knowledge and experience. 582 Thus, if secret information comes into an em-
ployee's possession due to a confidential relationship with the employer, the
employee has a duty not to commit a breach of the confidence by disclosing
or otherwise using it to the employer's disadvantage. 583 When a former em-
ployee commits the tort of unfair competition, an employer may be able to
enjoin the employee from using or disclosing the secret or confidential infor-
mation. 584 In addition, monetary damages can be awarded for lost profits
based on the difference between the employer's market position before and
after the misappropriation of the confidential information. 585
V. ERISA AND WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
The primary purpose of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) 586 is to protect the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans and their beneficiaries. 587 Accordingly, ERISA requires disclosure
and reporting, establishes certain fiduciary standards of conduct, responsibil-
ity, and obligation, and authorizes appropriate penalties against employers,
trustees, and other entities who fail to comply with its mandates.5 8 With
respect to employment status, ERISA strictly prohibits discharging an em-
ployee under certain circumstances.58 9
The United States Supreme Court defined the breadth and impact of the
ERISA preemption doctrine in several significant decisions: FMC Corp. v.
Holliday,590 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,59 1 Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Taylor,592 Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 593 Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,594 and Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 59 5
In those decisions, the Supreme Court expressly held that the preemption
clause of ERISA provides that ERISA supersedes all state laws insofar as
they relate to any employee benefit plan, except state laws that regulate in-
582. Johnston v. American Speedreading Academy, Inc., 526 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
583. Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. O'Donnell, 627 S.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
584. Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1973, writ refd n.r.e.).
585. Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. at 585, 314 S.W.2d at 776.
586. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
587. Id. § 1001(b).
588. Id. § 1001(b).
589. Id. § 1140. Under ERISA, an employer cannot discharge an employee "for exercising
any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan ... or for the
purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such [employee] may become
entitled under the plan .... " Id.
590. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
591. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
592. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
593. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
594. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
595. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
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surance. 596 Recognizing that the preemption provisions of ERISA are delib-
erately expansive, the Supreme Court observed that Congress provided
explicit direction that ERISA preempts common law causes of action filed in
state court. 597 The Fifth Circuit 598 and the Texas Supreme Court599 have
repeatedly recognized ERISA's broad preemption of common law claims
that relate to an employee benefit plan.
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden 600 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed who is an employee under ERISA. The Court adopted a common
law test for determining who qualifies as an "employee" under ERISA.6°"
Relying on its previous definition in Community for Creative Non- Violence v.
Reid 602 for an appropriate definition of the general common law determina-
tion of an employee,6 3 the Court rejected the broad definition of employee
596. There are limited exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(b), 1144
(1988).
597. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 44-45.
598. Hogan v. Kraft Foods, 969 F.2d 142, 144 (5th Cir. 1992) (ERISA preempted plain-
tiff's claims for breach of contract, violations of TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 and TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, negligence,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d
1209, 1218-19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 68 (1992) (ERISA preempted claims for
fraud, civil conspiracy, breach of employment contract, unlawful interference with contract
rights, negligence and gross negligence); Lee v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 894 F.2d 755,
756-58 (5th Cir. 1990) (ERISA preempted fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims); Ra-
mirez v. Inter-Continental Hotels, 890 F.2d 760, 762-64 (5th Cir. 1989) (ERISA preempted
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21); Boren v. N.L Indus., Inc., 889 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3283 (1990) (ERISA preempted claim for breach of contract);
Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1293-97 (5th Cir. 1989) (ERISA preempted
plaintiff's breach of contract claim); Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 893-95 (5th Cir.
1989) (ERISA preempted claim for breach of an oral agreement to pay early retirement bene-
fits); Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1988)
(ERISA preempted claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, equitable estoppel, breach
of contract and fraud).
599. Gorman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 811 S.W.2d 542, 546 (Tex.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 88 (1991) (ERISA preempted plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract, common law fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, statutory
violations under TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 3.62 and 21.21, violations of applicable regulatory
orders issued by the State Board of Insurance, and deceptive trade practices under the TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46-.62); Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Small, 806 S.W.2d 800, 801
(Tex. 1991) (ERISA preempted plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing, fraud, negligence, gross negligence, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and violations of the Texas Insurance Code and the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act); Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 805 S.W.2d 387, 388-90 (Tex.), cert. denied, I11 S.
Ct. 2855 (1991) (ERISA preempted plaintiff's claims under the Texas Insurance Code and the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Pan Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Erbauer Constr. Co., 805 S.W.2d
395, 396 (Tex.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 86 (1991) (ERISA preempted plaintiff's claims for bad
faith settlement practices in violation of the Texas Insurance Code and the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act).
600. 112 S. Ct. 1344 (1992).
601. Id. at 1348.
602. 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989).
603. Darden, 112 S. Ct. at 1348. Quoting Reid, the Court summarized the definition as
follows:
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common
law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and
means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant
to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and
tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the
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under the Fair Labor Standards Act and concluded that the "textual asym-
metry" between FLSA and ERISA precludes reliance on FLSA cases when
construing the definition of "employee" under ERISA. 6 4
In Burks v. Amerada Hess Corp. 60 5 Thomas Burks sustained an on-the-job
injury and filed workers' compensation. Soon thereafter, Amerada Hess
Corporation (Hess) fired Burks, allegedly for using company property for his
personal benefit during work hours. Burks sued Hess for retaliatory dis-
charge for filing a workers' compensation claim, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, defamation and unlawful termination, all arising from his
termination of employment and the denial of his long term benefits. Hess
removed the case to federal court based upon ERISA. After Burks amended
his complaint, the federal district court remanded the case to state court.
Hess appealed the order of remand.
On appeal the Fifth Circuit observed that the district court's order of re-
mand was based upon the rationale that it did not have discretion to exercise
jurisdiction over pendent state claims. 6 6 Because this reasoning is not a
ground for remand under section 1447(c),607 the court noted that it had ju-
risdiction to review the remand order.6° 8 The court observed that Burks'
complaint was properly removed because Burks claimed that his discharge
constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress and that the denial of
long-term benefits was intentional infliction of emotional distress.6 9 The
court held that Hess properly removed the case and that Burks' claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from the denial of em-
ployee benefits is preempted by ERISA.6 10 Finally, the court expressly dis-
approved of Burks' attempt at forum manipulation by deleting all of his
federal claims to get the district court to remand. 6 11 The court noted that
parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to
work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assist-
ants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;
whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and
the tax treatment of the hired party.
Id. at 1348 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52).
604. Id. at 1350.
605. 8 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 1993).
606. Id. at 304.
607. 29 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1989). Section 1447(c) provides two grounds for remand: (1) a
defect in removal procedure and (2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Burks, 8 F.3d at 304.
608. Burks, 8 F.3d at 304. The court observed that it had jurisdiction to review an order of
remand if the district court affirmatively states a non-section 1447(c) ground for remand. Id.
at 304 n.4.
609. Id. at 304.
610. Id. at 305.
611. Id. at 306. In Brown v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir.
1990), the court stated:
[C]ourts should consider whether the plaintiff has attempted to manipulate the
forum in which his case will be heard simply by deleting all federal-law claims
from the complaint and requesting that the district court remand the case, and
should guard against such manipulation by denying motions to remand where
appropriate.
Brown, 901 F.2d at 1255. See Fuerza Unida v. Levi Strauss & Co., 986 F.2d 970, 975 (5th Cir.
1993) (approving language in Brown).
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the Supreme Court urged the lower federal courts to guard against such
manipulation by denying motions to remand where appropriate.612
In Maldonado v. JM. Petroleum Corp.613 the federal district court ad-
dressed the issue of whether ERISA preemption applies to damage claims of
the loss of pension benefits resulting from termination of employment. In
Maldonado, Joe Maldonado filed suit in state court against his former em-
ployer claiming race discrimination and wrongful termination. The em-
ployer removed the case to federal court by arguing that a federal question
under ERISA existed because Maldonado sought damages for the value of
all lost employee benefits. The employer premised the removal on the basis
that the ERISA claim preempted all state claims. Maldonado, on the other
hand, sought a remand to state court. The federal court agreed with Maldo-
nado and held that federal jurisdiction does not attach when the loss of pen-
sion benefits is merely a consequence of a termination. 614 Because the value
of lost pension benefits is calculable, ascertaining this value does not affect
the integrity of the benefit plan, endanger other pension benefits, nor hinder
plan administration. 615 Consequently, the court held that Maldonado's
claim for the lost value of employment, including retirement benefits, does
not relate to ERISA; therefore, the court granted Maldonado's motion to
remand. 616
VI. CONCLUSION
The past year has once again been one of numerous and important devel-
opments in employment and labor law. With the increased level of attention
of the "rights" of employees in the workplace, employers will be required to
deal with an ever increasingly complex web of employment laws and issues.
The developments of these issues in the legislatures and the courts must be
monitored by management and defense counsel. The operational impact and
the significant economic risks which flow from employment law develop-
ments and employment-related litigation are significant and justify close
examination.
612. Id. at 306 (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)).
613. 827 F. Supp. 1285 (S.D. Tex, 1993).
614. Id. at 1287 (citing Samuel v. Langham, 780 F. Supp. 424 (N.D. Tex. 1992)).
615. Id.
616. Id.
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